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ENERGY POLICY: A TEST FOR FEDERALISM
Jon Mills* & R. D. Woodson**
The central problem of federalism results from the lack of a clear
demarcation of authority between the states and the federal govern-
ment. The extent of state power has been a point of contention from
the writing of the federalist papers to the cry of states' rights during
the school desegregation controversy.1 In recent years the dispute has
focused on clashes between state and federal energy policy. State and
federal perspectives regarding energy may differ markedly. To the
federal government the energy issue involves balance of payments,
foreign relations, and national security. To state and local govern-
ments, on the other hand, the focus is pragmatic and localized, the wel-
fare of the state and its citizens being the primary concern. Thus, for
instance, concern for safety may make a locality leery of nuclear power,
while the federal government sees it as the only alternative to drastic
increases in oil imports.
Three possible allocations of governmental responsibility are
possible. In certain areas of exclusive federal responsibility, the pre-
emption doctrine precludes any role for the states.2 Traditional
examples of preemptive activity are found in the federal government's
* Executive Director of the Center of Governmental Responsibility, University of
Florida. B.A. 1969, Stetson University; J.D. 1972, University of Florida. Member
of the Florida bar.
** Assistant Director of the Center of Governmental Responsibility, University of
Florida. B.S. 1972, Auburn University; J.D. 1975, University of Florida. Member of
the Florida bar.
1. See Swann v. Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1971). History has
shown a tendency for federal power to increase, with judicial approval usually forthcom-
ing. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (expansion of federal power
under the commerce clause). Certain recent federal efforts, however, have been aimed
at relinquishing to state and local governments areas of authority formerly assumed by
the federal government. Perhaps the best example is the revenue sharing program. State
and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1228 (Supp. V, 1975).
2. Preemption results from the relationship between specific constitutional powers
of the federal government and the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, giving
federal laws preeminence over conflicting state laws. See generally Engdahl, Preemptive
Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLo. L. REv. 51 (1973).
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leasing of oil-bearing lands on the Outer Continental Shelf [OCS] beyond
the 3-mile limit' and the Federal Power Commission's [FPC] control
over pricing of natural gas intended for the interstate market. 4 In other
areas, where the federal government has failed to act expressly or
impliedly5 or where the Constitution has been interpreted as failing to
delegate authority to the federal government, the state may act under
the police power' to protect its citizenry from potential adverse impacts
of energy development and utilization. These principles are consistent
with traditional notions of federalism, whereby the state and federal
governments are viewed as pitted against one another for authority or
jurisdiction, with the judiciary as the final arbiter.7
The third possibility reflects a more modem view of federalism
which embraces the concept of state-federal cooperation. Cooperative
efforts, in addition to avoiding divisive power struggles, can utilize the
strengths of each level of government: a federal mandate may give
added force to an enactment and counteract certain local pressures on
state governments, while state involvement will increase sensitivity to
local problems and conditions and contribute to effective ultimate
implementation. Perhaps the most significant advantage is the ability
of the combined federal-state authorities to draw on all the power allo-
cated to government in the American constitutional system. The
increasingly complex nature of energy problems and solutions seems
to favor the cooperative approach of this new federalism, under which
a solution tailored to the diverse energy needs of America's varying
geographical and sociological conditions is more readily achievable.8
Under neither the traditional nor the new federalism can the
numerous facets of the energy problem be resolved in a single effort.
Energy policy development affects numerous topics critical to the states,
ranging from land use to air and water pollution to public transporta-
tion. It thus is not a unified issue, but a conglomerate of otherwise
3. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 717-717w (1970).
5. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); U.S. CONST. amend. X.
6. This is the power inherent in any level of sovereign government to pass rules
and regulations for the common good, safety, health, morals, and to promote order for
the general welfare of society. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Ad-Express,
Inc. v. Kirin, 516 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1975).
7. See generally United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); Mintz v. Baldwin,
289 U.S. 346 (1933).
8. A striking example of the successes and failures of this posture was demonstrat-
ed in the governmental response to environmental pollution from energy use. Recogniz-
ing that a successful effort required participation by all states, that local pressure had
precluded state action in the past, and that adequate monitoring and implementation
required both federal funds and state knowledge of local conditions, the federal govern-
ment enacted nationwide air and water controls which entrusted a primary executive role
to the states. See 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970). See also Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6222 (Supp. V, 1975).
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tangentially related matters linked only because all involve energy.
The consequence of this diversity is that policy formulation appears as
either a shotgun effort to treat all aspects without adequate depth in
any, or as an overly narrow policy that fails to treat comprehensively
the ramifications of the whole energy question. Because energy is
elemental to an industrialized society, the implications of energy policy
change as suddenly as the society and its technology. Therefore, no
evaluation of energy policy or energy conservation can hope to solve
completely the energy problem. Similarly, the variable nature of
energy problems and policies precludes a final demarcation of the
boundaries of state and federal authority in this area. However, certain
limits and desirable patterns can be defined to guide legislators at the
state and federal levels in determining appropriate areas for exercise
of their authority.
This Article: will examine the bases of state and federal power,
exploring areas of both potential and existing conflict within the energy
field. Situations in which either the state or federal government
appears to have exclusive authority also will be scrutinized. Possible
answers to problems caused by the clashing of governmental interests
will be suggested, with an eye toward aiding policymakers to reach
agreements which may avert such conflicts. Finally, a prognosis of the
future of federalism in regard to the energy issue will be offered.
SOURCES OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER
It is fundamental constitutional doctrine that the United States
government is one solely of delegated powers.' Those powers not
expressly granted to the federal government in the Constitution are
reserved to the states.' 0 It is from this basis that an examiration of
the respective powers of each level of government must proceed.
Powers Delegated to the Federal Government
Any analysis of state and federal authority to make energy policy
should begin with the supremacy clause" since it is the Constitution's
most direct statement on the state-federal power relationship. This
clause gives preemptive power to federal enactments supported by con-
9. E.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970); Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 81 (1907); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. X. State powers are limited in some cases by constitutional
provisions, such as that forbidding states to coin money. Id. art. I, § 10. Other
limitations are contained in state constitutions. For example, the Arizona Constitution
prohibits the legislature from enacting local or special laws in a list of specific situations.
ARiz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19761
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
stitutionally enumerated federal powers, thus enabling them to override
conflicting state laws. 2 Preemption can become operative through an
express congressional statement to that effect, or it can be implied from
the circumstances. For instance, implied preemption may be found
where a state regulation produces results inconsistent with the purpose
and goals of a federal statute;"3 where federal regulation is so pervasive
as to preclude state authority, 14 or where the particular subject regu-
lated demands uniformity among all states.',
Caution must be exercised in concluding that a matter is one
giving rise to implied preemption. Even though a matter may be one
amenable to nationwide regulation, Congress may allow the states a
role in an area where federal preemption might be otherwise assumed.
An example is provided by the case of Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc.,16 ruling on the constitutionality of Florida's Oil-Spill
Prevention and Pollution Control Act.'7  The contested state legisla-
tion, which imposed strict liability for damage resulting from an oil spill
in Florida's territorial waters, was alleged to be preempted by the
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970'1 and overriding principles
of federal maritime law. Despite the pervasiveness of federal controls
under the Water Quality Improvement Act and the federal govern-
ment's historical domination of maritime law, however, the Supreme
Court upheld the state legislation, pointing to specific congressional
expressions of an intent to maintain a role for the state in regulating
oil pollution.' 9 The Court declared that "sea-to-shore pollution" was
12. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 56-57.
13. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
14. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 169 (1942). See also New York
State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublins, 413 U.S. 405, 412-17 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962);
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
One author suggests that the following factors recur most often in judicial appraisals
of preemption: first, the purpose or intent of Congress as disclosed by the federal statute
and its legislative history must be determined. Additionally the pervasiveness of the
federal regulatory scheme and the design of any implementing administrative procedures
as well as the nature and degree of state interest in regulation of the subject matter
should be examined. Further, whether, under the circumstances of a particular case,
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress should be examined. Finally, consideration should be given
to the nature of the subject matter regulated, and whether it is one which requires
exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to national interests.
Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. Rav. 653, 680 (1974).
16. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 376.011-.021 (Supp. 1976).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970).
19. 411 U.S. at 329. The Water Quality Improvement Act stated that it should not
be construed to affect any state or local law not in conflict with the Act's provisions or
to preempt state or local imposition of liability or requirements in regard to oil spills. 33
U.S.C. § 1161(a) (1970). Additionally, cooperative action with the states was mandat-
ed in national contingency plans to be prepared by the.President. Id. § 1161(c)(2).
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"historically within reach of the police power of the states, ' 20 and that
the federal and state enactments were "harmonious parts of an inte-
grated whole."21  This decision clearly demonstrates that, despite the
possibility of preemption, federal statutes may set standards relating to
energy and at the same time allow or encourage state standards which
may be more stringent.
Most disputes over application of the supremacy clause involve
neither a manifest congressional approval, such as that present in the
Askew case, nor a clear expression of preemption. The Supreme
Court itself has recognized that each case is decided on its own
pecularities and that "prior cases on preemption are not precise guide-
lines" to be followed.2 2  Because the issue is subject to such wide-
ranging judicial discretion, a court's evaluation of the subject matter as
national or local can be conclusive. The existing cases establish that,
as a general rule, preemption of a traditional state power is not
favored; 23 therefore, when preemption or lack thereof is not clear on
the face of the statute, the nature of the power exercised by the state
apparently will influence the determination. 2' From these general
trends, however, no long term guidelines can be formulated. Conceiv-
ably, a local matter of today will be a matter requiring nationwide uni-
formity in the future, or vice versa. Preemption doctrine thus can be
clarified little further than a delineation of the three somewhat broad
questions that must enter into any preemption determination. First,
is the basic claim of federal authority constitutionally exercised? Addi-
tionally, did Congress express an intent as to whether preemption
should operate? Finally, if congressional intent is not manifest, does
the subject matter require preemption or is it a local matter? In energy
matters, the answer to the first of these questions generally depends
on interpretation of the constitutional delegations to the federal govern-
ment of the power to tax and spend and the power over interstate com-
merce. Occasionally, the war power also may have relevance.
The Spending and Taxing Powers. The federal spending power,
which originates in article I of the Constitution, 25 authorizes Congress
20. 411 U.S. at 343.
21. Id. at 331.
22. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,- 638 (1973).
23. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1974); Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 307 (1943).
24. This consideration seems to have been influential, for instance, in cases denying
preemption of state input into the siting of atomic reactors. See Northern Cal. Ass'n to
Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor, -Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d
200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964); In re Florida Power & Light Co., St. Lucie Nuclear Plant
No. 2: Application for Site Certification, Case No. 75-006, Order No. 82 (Before the
Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida, 1976).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-9.
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to appropriate and spend in promotion of any objectives deemed worth-
while in furtherance of the general welfare and subject to the limita-
tions of the Bill of Rights.26 The spending power is often used as a
public policy tool, to provide incentives for citizens and local govern-
ments to take actions not ordinarily within federal control. With this
type of federal action, therefore, development of state energy policies
can be subjected to a broadened federal influence.
"Buying compliance," as in the Emergency Highway Energy
Conservation Act,27 is the most significant such exercise of the spending
power. Conditions imposed on grants, contracts, and other expendi-
tures by the federal government ensure state cooperation with stipula-
tions which Congress could not otherwise constitutionally impose.
Courts recognize no legal restrictions on such conditions so long as there
is no abridgement of due process. 28  The states, of course, are free to
ignore federal policy thus imposed simply by rejecting conditional
grants; once money has been accepted on conditions, however, the con-
ditions must be satisfied.29
Congress' authority to lay and collect taxes also is subject to few
limitations. Although the basic purpose of this power is production of
revenue, other objectives such as the conservation of energy may be
accomplished through tax incentives. Taxes have been used to affect
energy policy, for example, with the oil depletion allowance.80 Tax
incentives relating to energy conservation, such as increased gasoline
taxes, have been continually proposed.
The Commerce Power. As initially interpreted, the distribution
of federal and state powers effectuated by the commerce clause"
embodied the concept of dual sovereignty, in which the states and the
nation exercised exclusive authority in their respective spheres.8 2  Thus
a dichotomy existed between interstate and intrastate commerce which
was also the dividing line for governmental authority. With the growth
of industry and commerce to national dimensions and the advent of
26. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-239, § 3, 87 Stat. 1046, as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 154,
88 Stat. 2281 (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.). The Emergency Highway
Energy Conservation Act denied federal highway funds to any state which did not
employ a 55 mile-per-hour speed limit. 23 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. V, 1975).
28. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
29. The states have the power to prevent private persons within their jurisdictions
om complying with the conditions of a federal grant. United States v. Burnison, 339
U.S. 87 (1956). However, if the spending power is used to achieve an objective within
the sphere of enumerated federal powers, state regulation will be preempted. See
Alabama NAACP State Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 (M.D.
Ala. 1967).
30. 26 U.S.C. § 611 (1970).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
32. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
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social and economic focus transcending local concern, the artificial
interstate-intrastate dichotomy animating the concept proved to be
untenable.3  The resultant break with traditional doctrine was
achieved through the Supreme Court's expansive redefinition of the
federal interstate commerce power to include matters formerly consid-
ered intrastate in nature.34 Such power, however, is not limitless. In
determining the validity of a congressional exercise of commerce clause
power to regulate purely intrastate activity, the determinative question
is whether Congress has a rational basis for finding that the regulated
activity affects interstate commerce. 5 If it does, the means selected
by Congress to eliminate the evil must be reasonable and appropriate.3 6
Congressional power may not be extended so as to encompass effects
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote as to obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local.3" The Supreme
Court, in establishing these principles, has recognized the need to
reserve some matters of commerce regulation to the state and to place
some restrictions on congressional power.
Nevertheless, the expansion of federal interstate commerce
authority has resulted in increasing judicial scrutiny of state regulation
of commerce. The Supreme Court has recognized that despite Con-
gress' power over interstate commerce, the states are not precluded
from exercising their police powers in matters of local concern, even
if such an exercise affects interstate commerce.38 However, substantial
limitations remain on state regulation of interstate commerce. A major
restraint, and one relevant in establishing energy policy, is the prohibi-
tion against a state's attempting to isolate itself from problems shared
nationally.39 Additionally, any attempt at state regulation must be
reasonable and necessary in light of local interests and concerns. 40  In
Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,41 for example, the
Supreme Court held that state regulation must protect a manifest local
33. For a summary of modem commerce power views, see Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146 (1971).
34. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of a
small quantity of wheat grown exclusively for home consumption; although never
marketed interstate, the wheat was said to supply needs of the grower which would
otherwise be satisfied by purchases from the interstate market).
35. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
36. Id. at 262.
37. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (dictum); California v. Thompson,
313 U.S. 109 (1941). These cases conclude that there are matters which-because of
their numbers, diversity, and local character-may never be dealt with adequately by
Congress.
39. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941). In the context of energy
policy, this means that no oil-producing state may enact measures to restrict the export
of oil to consuming states. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
41. 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
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interest and must outweigh any national interest in equivalent regula-
tion. Upheld in that case was the power of a state to set natural gas
prices at the wellhead as a means of preventing uneconomic dissipation.
The state and federal interests in conservation coincided, and the state
means adopted were held reasonably related to this legitimate end.
This case illustrates that where regulation of local matters also operates
as a regulation of interstate commerce, reconciliation of conflicting
claims of state and national power may be attained only by appraisal
and accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national
interests involved.42  Where the balancing of interests indicates a con-
siderable state interest in the regulation, impingement upon the under-
lying federal commerce power may be allowed.
War Powers. Under the war powers clause of the Constitution48
the federal government has exclusive control over matters affecting
national security. Where federal authority is based on war powers,
preemptive effect is uniformly recognized. In relation to energy, three
areas of war power authority have been recognized: control of oil
policy, generation of electric power, and atomic energy.
Recognition of the relationship between oil policy and national
security began in 1904 when President Taft withdrew several million
acres of public lands as naval oil reserves to ensure the Navy's ability
42. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Several cases
affecting energy policy have involved this balancing of competing interests in determin-
ing whether state action affecting interstate commerce is valid. In Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), the Supreme Court dealt not only
with the preemption issue but also found that the smoke abatement ordinance, as it
applied to interstate shippers, did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The
Court based its holding on congressional recognition that primary responsibility for
preventing air pollution was with the states. Id. at 446.
In Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1(Me.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973), the Maine supreme court upheld a state
licensing procedure and state regulations for oil carriers conducting transfers within that
state's coastal waters. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 541-557 (Supp. 1973). After
determining that the license fee imposed on those engaged in the over-water transfer of
oil was fair, reasonable, and did not discriminate against interstate commerce, 307 A.2d
at 38-39, citing Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1973), the court considered the constitutionality of the state regulations. The
opinion began by noting that the commerce clause did not absolutely preclude the states
from exercising power, leaving the states free to regulate unless their laws conflicted with
federal law. 307 A.2d at 39, citing Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 245 (1829). The latter distinction turned upon whether the subject which the
state sought to regulate was of national or local concern. 307 A.2d at 39, citing
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Finding that the state's need to
control and prevent oil spillage was a subject of vital local concern, the court reasoned
that the primary responsibility for controlling such pollution lay with the state. See 307
A.2d at 40. Since the state law did not openly conflict with any federal law, nor
deliberately discriminate against interstate commerce, it was held to be a valid exercise
of state power.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This authority is broadened by the necessary and
proper clause and by the recognition that authority over foreign policy is inherent in
national sovereignty.
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to fulfill its fuel requirements.44 Furthermore, as early as 1954 the
need to supplement domestic supply with imported oil was thought to
present a threat to national security."5 In partial response to this per-
ceived threat the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 was passed,
requiring the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization to advise
the President whenever there was reason to believe that any article was
being imported in such quantities as to threaten national security."
Pursuant to this Act, the Mandatory Oil Import Program was estab-
lished in 1959,47 giving the President authority to regulate quota levels
and allocations to domestic claimants. This function has been handled
by various agencies in the executive branch, and currently is controlled
by the Federal Energy Administration [FEA]. 8
The FEA has been given great leeway by the courts in the control
of imports and allocation. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon49 an oil company
challenged FEA regulations as violative of the National Environmental
Policy Act [NEPA], arguing that no environmental impact statement
was prepared prior to promulgation of regulations. The court held that
because of Congress' intention for swift emergency action due to the
national energy crisis, the FEA's actions took precedence over NEPA.50
Thus federal activity in the area of fuel allocation has preempted any
allocation conflicting with the federal scheme. A designation of neces-
sity to national security pursuant to the war power in any phase of oil
policy seemingly would similarly preempt state activity.
The second area in which the war power has played an important
role is the generation of electric power. In Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority5 the Supreme Court upheld the construction of a dam
and electrical generating facilities pursuant to the war power as neces-
sary to national security, even though the construction took place during
peacetime. The case demonstrates both the breadth of the war power
and the importance of the generation of electricity to national security.
From it can be inferred the possibility of war power preemption of state
control over electrical generation.
44. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (upholding the
withdrawal).
45. History of the Federal Energy Organization, Hearings on S. Res. 45 Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973).
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1862(b) (Supp. V, 1975).
47. Id. § 1862.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 761 (Supp. V, 1975); Exec. Order No. 11,790, §§ 4-5, 3A C.F.R.
§ 157 (Supp. 1974).
49. 502 F.2d 1154 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
50. Id. at 1157. For further analysis of the Federal Administration [FEA] authority,
see Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 991 (1975); California v. Simon, 504 F.2d 430 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974);
Mandel v. Simon, 493 F.2d 1239 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
51. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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The war power is most controversial in relation to nuclear power.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the Atomic Energy Com-
mission [AEC] to control policy aspects of atomic energy develop-
ment.5 2  The emphasis in relation to power development was shifted
to private companies by the AEC retaining power as licensing agency.58
Under current law54 nuclear power is controlled at the federal level by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Although for a long period states
refrained from acting in the area, the role of the states is currently in
a state of uncertainty, 55 due to an increasing tendency by state govern-
ments to insert themselves in this field, at least as to siting procedures.
However, the bases for federal authority in relation to nuclear power-
the war power and supremacy clauses-are formidable obstacles for the
states to surmount.586
Powers Reserved to the States
State energy legislation must be based on some inherent or consti-
tutional power of the state, generally the inherent authority termed the
police power. The police power, which is implicitly recognized in the
tenth amendment to the Constitution,57 entails the broad authority
possessed by a sovereignty to legislate in furtherance of the health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizenry." Few judicial
limits have been placed on this power, and a legislative declaration that
a law promotes the public welfare generally is sufficient to ensure its
recognition as a legitimate exercise of the police power. Thus, in
recognition of its broad scope, the police power has been characterized
as the power "to promote the public welfare by restraining and regulat-
ing the use of liberty and property limited only by constitutional and
reasonable judicial requirements." 59  Because of the changing social,
economic, and political conditions, it is a flexible power, constantly
evolving to fulfill its purpose of promoting the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare.
52. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2296 (1970)).
53. Act of Dec. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-560 § 3, 84 Stat. 1472, amending 42
U.S.C. § 2121 (1970).
54. 42 U.S.C § 2011 (1970).
55. See Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor Inc. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964).
56. Murphy & 'La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the
Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 392, 434
(1976).
57. This amendment reserves to the states those powers not prohibited to them nor
delegated to the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
58. Perry Trading Co. v. Ervin, 46 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1950). See text & note 6 supra.
59. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTTTONAL LAW 266 (1st ed. 1963).
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One of the strongest justifications for the state regulation in the
energy area is public safety. For example, the storage6" and distribu-
tion61 of gasoline may be regulated to protect the state's citizens from
danger of personal injury. Similarly, the inherent dangers of operating
motor vehicles justify state regulation under the police power despite
an unavoidable impact upon interstate commerce.2 Similarly, the
enactment of 55 mile-per-hour speed limits in all states for energy con-
servation could be justified under the safety aspect of the police power,
since the result has been a decrease in highway deaths. Most energy-
related regulations, however, are justified as promotive of the general
welfare. This is the case, for instance, with laws aimed at conservation
of energy resources, an area which is likely to be a major thrust of state
energy policy action. These illustrations should demonstrate the
breadth of the police power as a justification for state energy legislation
and regulations. Were it not for the preemptive effect of federal pro-
nouncements, doubtless the state police power would provide ample
authority for virtually any type of energy-related regulation. Thus the
primary questions revolve around the scope of federal rather than state
power; where federal power does not preclude state activity, state
power generally exists.
AREAS OF PRESENT INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICT
Although some areas of energy control fall clearly within the ambit
of either state or federal authority, 68 the uncertainties in other areas
have given rise to various intergovernmental clashes. Energy develop-
ment almost inevitably seems to entail threats to the natural anid human
environment; thus potential for conflict inheres in the growing public
and governmental concern regarding both energy supply and environ-
mental protection. The most heated conflicts to date have occurred
in relation to nuclear power facilities and development of offshore oil
resources. An examination of these controversies is illustrative of the
sort of intergovernmental problems likely to arise as the move for
energy independence continues, and may provide some guidance to
officials seeking to minimize future clashes.
60. City of Miami v. Direct Distributors, Inc., 134 Fla. 430, 183 So. 841 (1938).
61. Mayo v. Texas Co., 137 Fla. 218, 188 So. 206 (1939).
62. Miami Transit Co. v. McLin, 101 Fla. 1233, 133 So. 99 (1931).
63. For example, the area of state procurement, that is, the purchase by the state of
goods for its own use, seems clearly within the area of state authority. This is supported
by the fact that under the new Energy Policy and Conservation Act the federal
government has specifically exempted state procurement from preemption by federal
regulations. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat.
871 (codified in scattered sections of 15 & 42 U.S.C.).
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Nuclear Power
The nuclear power controversy currently sparks the most heated
debate. Several states, concerned with the potentially devastating
effects of malfunction or sabotage, 4 are considering measures to ban
or control the development of nuclear power within their borders. 5 At
the same time the federal government, in particular the executive
branch, has been promoting the case of nuclear power. 6 As yet the
constitutional delineations of power have not been finally resolved,
although the federal preemptive claim seems to be prevailing in regard
to most tested aspects of the nuclear power problem.
It is reasonable to assume that both the state police power and
the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce afford suffici-
ent basis for the regulation of the design, construction, and operation
of nuclear power reactors.6 7  Thus, the demarcation is dependent upon
the extent of express or implied preemption currently operative. The
revelant federal enactment against which preemption must be gauged
is the Atomic Energy Act,68 the critical provision of which states,
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of
any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards.""0 This provision has been inter-
preted as expressing a congressional intent to endow the federal
government with exclusive authority to regulate the construction and
operation of nuclear plants, including the discharge of nuclear waste.70
64. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 56. See generally Note, Malevolent Acts
and Nuclear Power: Additional Protection Under NEPA and the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, 16 Aiuz. L. Rav. 920 (1974).
65. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 56, at 392.
66. Fifteen percent of the nation's energy consumption is projected to be derived
from nuclear power by 1985 and as many as 1400 nuclear power plants could be
operating by the year 2000, according to some estimates. Oversight Hearings on
Nuclear Energy-Overview of the Major Issues Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 94-16, pt. 1, at 77 (1976).
67. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 56.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970). The 1954 Atomic Energy Act, enacted during
a time when atomic energy was a sensitive area of national security and considered a
matter for national control, leaves little room for state regulation. However, amend-
ments passed in 1959 specifically to govern state authority to regulate nuclear power,
id. § 2021, amending The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat.
688, contained indications that cooperation would be encouraged. For instance, provi-
sion was made for state-federal agreements which could confer on states the authority
to regulate nuclear plants. ld. § 2021(b).
69. Id. § 2021(k).
70. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afj'd,
405 U.S 1035 (1972). Subsection k actually limits the overall application of section
2021, and the section therefore has no effect on "the authority of any state or local
agency" except with regard to protection against radiation hazards. Subsection c of
section 2021 enumerated federal radiation hazard concerns relating to construction and
operation, export or import, and disposal in ocean or sea. Consequently, the statute
could be interpreted to preempt state actions within these four areas, but the wording of
section 2021(k) indicates that nothing else should be affected, including siting proce-
dures.
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According to the eighth circuit court, such federal preemption is neces-
sary in order to ensure that industrial energy development is not stifled
by overly stringent requirements.7 1 Under this reading, the state would
be precluded from imposing requirements stricter than those of the fed-
eral government. Even under this view, however, a state role might
be possible in such matters as the siting of nuclear plants. 72
A separate question is presented by a total state exclusion of
future nuclear plants or even perhaps a conditional exclusion: should
exclusion have the same legal effect as regulation? General principles
developed in relation to the commerce clause indicate that exclusion
would not be permissible if it resulted in an undue interference with
interstate commerce7l or if it imposed an unduly detrimental effect on
other states.74  Commentators have stated, however, "[t]here is no
room for any argument that state bills imposing a prohibition or mora-
torium on the construction of nuclear power plants are not within the
intended scope of preemption because Congress did not directly con-
template this type of state 'regulation' in enacting [section 2021]."'71
Future litigation of the nuclear issue is certain. It is also possible
that future federal legislation may attempt to clarify the area. Despite
claims to the contrary, it appears that states may have a role in regulat-
ing some aspects of nuclear power plants. The extent to which this
regulation will be allowed remains to be determined.
Offshore Oil and Gas Development
Jurisdiction over offshore oil reserves has been subject to contin-
ued dispute for over 20 years. Nonetheless, the United States has
turned increasingly to development of this resource in an effort to
reduce dependence on foreign oil. In United States v. California the
Supreme Court held that the federal government had full dominion
71. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). This argument is based on the premise that the issue of
nuclear power is one which by nature requires absolute federal control. Thus the
Northern States Power opinion was based on both express and implied preemption. See
also Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental
Relations Problem, 60 MicH. L. REv. 43, 44 (1962); Helman, Pre-emption: Approach-
ing Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. Rnv. 43,
67 (1967); Neel, Federal or State Turisdiction Over Atomic Products and Waste-A
Dilemma, 50 Ky. L.J. 52, 57 (1961).
72. See Northern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor, Inc. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 432, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964); In re Florida Power &
Light Co., St. Lucie Nuclear Plant No. 2: Application for Site Certification, Case No.
75-006, Order No. 82 (Before the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida, 1976);
discussion note 70 supra.
73. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
74. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
75. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 56, at 447.
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over the 3-mile territorial sea and the land thereunder as an incident
of national sovereignty. 76 This decision was partially nullified by the
enactment of the Submerged Lands Act whereby the federal govern-
ment relinquished to the coastal states submerged lands lying seaward
from their respective boundaries for a distance of 3 geographical
miles.77
Under the Submerged Lands Act the United States retains control
of the land and water of this belt for purposes of commerce, naviga-
tion, national defense, and international affairs 8 The Act indicates
that the rights retained by the federal government are paramount to
the proprietary rights granted to the states but do not exclude exercise
of those rights. The states have power to administer, lease, and
develop the submerged lands and the natural resources of the marginal
belt subject to the priority of the federal interest in those areas
named.79 These reservations by the federal government are in recog-
nition that the territorial sea is a major channel of interstate commerce
with important defense implications, but they do not reduce the states'
title to such lands beyond that inherent in the supremacy clause of the
Constitution."0 Thus the Submerged Lands Act granted to the coastal
states dominion over the offshore seabed within the territorial sea.
The Act expressly declared that its provisions in no way affected
federal control over the OCS beyond the marginal shelf."' By the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 Congress had declared it to be
the policy of the United States that the subsoil and seabed of the OCS
are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition. 2
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act expressly authorizes the
Secretary of Interior to prescribe rules and regulations which he deems
necessary for the leasing of OCS lands. 8 This authority has been used
76. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970). The act was held constitutional in Alabama v. Texas,
347 U.S. 272 (1954).
78. 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (1970).
79. Id.
80. The Submerged Lands Act was in essence a congressional expression of a desire
to allow coastal states control over the submerged lands off their coast within the
territorial sea. Such control is subject to the overriding federal concerns of commerce
and defense.
81. 43 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
82. Id. § 1332(a). See also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). In this
decision the federal government brought suit against the 13 Atlantic Coast states to
establish the completeness of federal authority over Outer Continental Shelf [OCS]
lands. Rights of dominion over submerged lands beyond the marginal seabelt were
claimed by the coastal states. The states based their claims to the lands as grantees or
successors of grantees of land grants from either the English or Danish crowns. Rejecting
these arguments the Supreme Court held that sovereign rights over the seabed and the
subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean from an area beyond the 3-mile marginal sea to
the outer edge of the Continental Shelf inhere in the federal government as an incident
of national sovereignty.
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1970). Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
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to formulate regulations designed to insure that development and oper-
ation of oil and gas wells are done in a safe and efficient manner . 4
All oil and gas leases issued under the authority of the Outer Contin-
tal Shelf Lands Act are subject to forfeiture for any breach of the rules
and regulations formulated by the Secretary."' Not only does the
Secretary have the right to lease OCS lands for oil and gas develop-
ment, but he also has authority to grant rights of way through these
lands for the transport of oil or gas. 6 Such authority gives the federal
government the ability to control the location of pipeline corridors up
the states' territorial sea. The successful completion of corridors to the
shore depends on the coastal state. Thus, the rules indicate that a coas-
tal state may not arbitrarily exclude or unreasonably restrict energy pro-
duction and transmission facilities.87 The standards effectively condi-
tion grants under the Coastal Zone Management Act on the states'
meeting their obligations for energy-related siting within their coastal
zones.
88
The federal government therefore has a tremendous impact on
energy-related development through its direct control over the disposi-
tion of federal lands. In turn, this federal power can have a strong
impact on state land use decisions. Presently the federal government
is attempting to coordinate the disposition of federally controlled OCS
lands with the affected coastal states' management programs.
Act, the Secretary of Interior is the leasing agent of the federal government charged with
the authority to lease OCS lands for oil and gas development. Id. § 1301-1315. Leases
are generally granted to the highest qualified bidder under a competitive bid system. To
date bidding has been by sealed bids and made upon the basis of the highest cash bonus
coupled with a fixed royalty of 122 percent. Id. 99 1335(a)-(b). The lease is
usually for a term of 5 years but subject to automatic extension as long as oil or gas is
produced from the leasehold in paying quantities. Id. § 1337(a).
84. 30 C.F.R. § 250.30 (1976).
85. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1970).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Coastal Zone Management Act is being seen as the principal tool to deal
with the OCS development that is likely to affect the coastal states. See 16 U.S.C. H9
1451-1464 (Supp. V, 1975). To date all the coastal states are participating un-
der the Coastal Zone Management Act. The Act insures that the state will have the
statutory mechanism to control onshore development. However, the one weak-
ness which still exists is the lack of funds for the coastal states to cope effec-
tively with such impact. Absent some federal aid in this area, it is recognized
that many states might not look favorably on OCS activities off their coast. To remedy
this problem the Senate has recently passed two bills to provide federal monies to aid
coastal states affected by OS activities. See id. § 1455 (Supp. V, 1975). See also
Governmental Research Council, Aid Sought for States Near OCS Development, 7 NAT.
J. REP., June 28, 1975, at 962.
Both of these measures would provide the coastal states which are affected by OCS
oil and gas development funds to meet onshore impacts. The bills establish funds
supported by rents, royalties, and fees levied on OCS production to be utilized by the
affected states to ameliorate adverse environmental effects and to control the social and
economic impacts associated with the development of federal energy resources. In
principle these measures are designed to insure that the actual cost of energy develop-
ment is borne by the whole nation.
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POTENTIAL GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES
Following the 1973-74 oil embargo imposed by the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries,. attention has focused on developing
alternatives to petroleum as a source of energy. In general the poten-
tial for intergovernmental conflict appears lesser in regard to solar
energy, geothermal energy, wind energy, and energy generated by solid
wastes than is true of the traditional fossil fuels or of nuclear energy.
This is because development of such energy forms is not known to
entail the dangers of nuclear power or the environmental costs of fossil
fuel extraction. Correspondingly, the prospects for federal-state coop-
eration are greater. There are nonetheless legal questions concerning
the appropriate role of each level of government in the development
of each of the primary alternative energy sources, though the issues
differ markedly from those raised by the previously discussed conflicts.
Solar Energy
An enormous supply of energy is received by the earth from the
sun. Solar energy is estimated to have the potential for supplying 25
percent of the United States' energy needs by the year 2020.0 The
greatest potential for early utilization of solar power lies in heating,
cooling, and supplying hot water for buildings-uses which currently
constitute 25 percent of United States' energy consumption. 0 Devel-
opment activities aimed at converting solar energy into electrical energy
also hold promise, though the implementation stage for such systems
lies some years in the future.9'
Although the development and utilization of solar energy could do
much to offset present and future energy shortages, initial capital costs
89. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF SOLAR
ENERGY, NATIONAL SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAM 1 (1975). The major technological problem in utilization of solar energy is
the low density of the energy upon its arrival at the earth's surface. Present technology
is sufficient to allow for the collection and utilization of solar energy for many purposes;
however, the low density requires collection devices of substantial cost.
90. A. PATTON, SOLAR ENERGY FOR HEATING AND COOLING OF BUILDINGS 1 (1975).
Solar heating and cooling systems use collectors, usually consisting of a flat plate that
absorbs heat from the sun's rays, covered on one side with transparent covers to prevent
reradiation and convection. The energy is transferred to a fluid, usually water, which is
then pumped to a storage tank for use as required. Id. at 1-35.
91. Solar thermal conversion, as this technique is known, involves collecting solar
energy, converting it to thermal energy, and then converting the thermal energy to
electrical energy. It is estimated that a 10,000 square mile solar farm utilizing these
collectors could supply the United States with its entire electrical power needs in the year
2000. See generally Oversight Hearing on the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstra-
tion Act of 1974, Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research, Development and Demon-
stration of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975).
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to both potential producers and consumers are formidable. State and
federal governments thus may find it desirable to offer assistance in
the form of financial assistance to research and development, as well
as tax incentives for commercial and private utilization. In addition to
offering support of this type, governments will need also to prescribe
protective standards and other regulatory measures.
Financing research and development is of nationwide importance
and logically is a matter for the federal government. Congress has
already taken certain steps in this area. The Solar Heating and Cooling
Demonstration Act, for example, directs that $60 million be applied to
promote the practical use of solar technology. 2 Another statute, the
Solar Energy Research, Development and Administration Act, allocated
$77 million for research and development of solar energy on a commer-
cial scale. 3  Some states have taken their own initiatives in funding
research and development facilities which can provide information on
solar energy. 4  Cooperative funding efforts such as these flow natur-
ally from the state and federal governments' mutual interest in the
development of clean energy.
Even under present technology, widespread use of solar energy
systems for heating and cooling residences and commercial buildings
is feasible, and some states may wish to encourage such use due to the
diminishing supply of fossil fuels. The most effective tool available for
a state to implement such policies traditionally has been the tax incen-
tive. Specifically, exempting the construction and maintenance of solar
energy facilities from state sales taxes, ad valorem taxes, corporate
taxes, and in some states income taxes will provide a financial incentive
to solar energy use.95 Corporations manufacturing equipment for such
systems also could be given tax relief. Several states have already en-
acted such measures into their tax codes. The federal government, of
course, could provide similar incentives through the federal income tax-
ation system, and such proposals are presently being considered by
Congress. 96 Because each level of government has its own tax system,
intergovernmental conflicts seem unlikely; rather, the coexistence of
92. 42 U.S.C. § 5501-5517 (Supp. V, 1975).
93. Id. §§ 5551-5566.
94. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. H§ 41-571 to -575 (Supp. 1976-77); FLA. STAT. § 74.185(1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-37-1 to -37-3 (Supp. 1976).
95. Illinois provides an exemption of up to $2000 from valuation of real property for
installation of a solar energy heating or cooling system. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 19-
23-2 (1959). New Mexico has a provision granting a tax credit on personal income tax
of 25 percent of the cost of equpment to an individual installing a solar unit. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 72-15A-11.2 (1976). Texas has exempted sales of solar energy devices from
taxation. TEx. RiEv. Civ. STAT. art. 20.04 (1976).
96. H.R. 8452, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 3848, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
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state and federal measures increases the incentive to produce and uti-
lize solar devices.
The potential proliferation of solar energy users will call for some
sort of governmental controls establishing, protecting, and regulating
rights in solar power. Obstructions blocking access to the sun, for
instance, would render units ineffective or totally useless. Although
at common law prescriptive rights to light could be acquired through
use over a period of years,9' many American jurisdictions have abro-
gated the right to acquire such easements. 98 Nor has any other sort
of right to the free flow of light across adjoining lands been recog-
nized,99 though litigation of this issue has been scarce. If solar users
are to be assured a continuing supply of their energy source, therefore,
it will be necessary for states to create and define legislatively solar
rights as a form of property right. Indeed, establishment of such rights
would seem a necessary prerequisite to the consumer's substantial
investment in solar equipment. Protection of this investment is
clearly within the state's police power. Another area of police power
regulation potentially requiring action to permit and encourage solar
energy use involves modification of restrictive zoning controls govern-
ing residential architecture. Building codes also may require amend-
ment.
Although these areas of regulation are preeminently within state
control, a substantial supportive role can be served by the federal
government. In 1928 the United States Department of Commerce
97. In England, the common law recognized a right to a prescriptive easement in
light. See Coils v. Home & Colonial Stores Ltd., [1904] A.C. 179. The common law
right was later granted recognition by Parliament and enacted into statute. See The
Rights of Light Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2 ch. 56.
98. See, e.g., Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204 (1874); Krulikowski v. Tide Water Oil
Sales Corp., 251 Mich. 684, 232 N.W.223 (1930); Austin v. Bloch, 165 Ore. 116, 105
P.2d 868 (1940). These cases reasoned that there could be no adverse user of light,
since the actual enjoyment of light occurs on one's own land and involves no encroach-
ment on a neighbor's property. Moreover, light easements were considered contrary to
the rapid growth of communities. Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859).
99. See Taliaferro v. Salyer, 162 Cal. App. 2d 685, 328 P.2d 799 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958); Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
App. 1959). In Fountainbleau Hotel a 14-story addition to an existing hotel would cast
a shadow over the cabana, swimming pool, and sunbathing areas of an adjacent hotel
during the winter months. An injunction against construction of the addition was
denied, the court holding that no cause of action for either damages or injunction arises
where a structure blocks light from adjoining property if the structure serves a useful
purpose. 114 So. 2d at 359. The court stated:
No American decision has been cited, and independent research has revealed
none, in which it has been held that-in the absence of some contractual or
statutory obligation-a landowner has a legal right to the free flow of light
and air across the adjoining land of his neighbor. Even at common law, the
landowner had no legal right in the absence of an easement or uninterrupted
use and enjoyment for a period of 20 years, to unobstructed light and air from
the adjoining land.
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published a Standard State Zoning Enabling Act'01 as a model for state
legislative enactments empowering local governments to establish land
use controls. A modification of this Act to protect and encourage solar
energy use would both aid states in amending their own laws and pro-
mote uniformity among the states. This is only an example of the
potential guidance and technical assistance which the federal govern-
ment, with its vast resources, is capable of providing to the states. 10'
Geothermal Resources
A second energy source inviting cooperative state and federal
action derives from the molten mass known as magma, which is usually
found 20 miles below the earth's crust.10 2  Fissures in the earth's crust
permit the magma to approach the surface, enabling man to exploit it
as a source of energy.' 0 3
Since geothermal resources are a complex mix of water, thermal
energy, gas, hot rocks, and possibly other mineral byproducts, a funda-
mental legal problem associated with them is one of classification.0 4
Ownership and control of such resources on lands subject to prior mix-
eral conveyance by the federal government are in question due to this'
lack of definite classification. Different laws deal with ownership and
control of the minerals, gas, and water found on lands within known
geothermal resource areas [KGRA]. 10 5 Prompt and beneficial de-
velopment of geothermal resources is dependent on determining
which set of laws is the applicable one. For instance, federal rights
in geothermal energy under mineral reservations contained in various
conveyances of public land are dependent on this resource being classi-
100. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928).
101. The federal government also could force state statutory modification by condi-
tioning federal housing or other assistance thereon. See text & notes 25-29 supra.
102. Bjorge, The Development of Geothermal Resources and the 1970 Geothermal
Steam Act-Law in Search of a Definition, 46 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 2 (1974).
103. Geothermal energy resources are of four types: dry steam, hot mineralized
water, hot dry rock, and geopressured zones. The dry steam system is typified by
geysers such as those in California. This system contains both water and steam in a
reservoir. Hearings on H.R. 8628 and H.R. 9658 Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the
House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973). The hot
water system consists of hot water fields often found at depths of up to 10,000 feet.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., PROBLEMS IN IDENTIFYING, DEVELOPING AND USING
GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES 20 (1975). Energy from these fields can be produced by the
hot water or flashing stream. The hot dry rock system differs from the other geothermal
sources since it contains no fluid. It would be necessary to introduce water into the
system to be heated by the surrounding hot rocks. The final system is the geopressured
zone. The zones consist of water-laden sand and clay at temperatures up to 283' C.
contained within impermeable layers. Id. at 22. It is felt that the water in the zone
probably contains a significant amount of methane gas in solution.
104. SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIvISIoN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 93D
CONG. 2ND SESS., REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY OF THE COMM. ON
SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, ser. Q (Comm. Print 1974).
105. Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 1001(e) (1970).
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fled as a mineral.1"' If the mineral classification is upheld, however,
no established leasing authority for geothermal resources on federally
controlled offshore lands will exist.'07
Courts have varied in their classification of geothermal resources,
and have classified them differently for different purposes.108 None
seems satisfactory; having characteristics of water, mineral, and gas,
geothermal resources fit neatly into no category. Water is merely a
transport mechanism for the energy, and sometimes must be artificially
introduced into the system. The steam produced, on the other hand,
is a result of the resource and not the resource itself. Nor does geo-
thermal energy have the characteristics traditionally associated with a
mineral.'09 Probably the most logical resolution of the classification
problem would be a distinct classification of geothermal resources and
enactment of separate regulations governing them."10 Since most of
the classification problems arise in the context of federal laws and
regulations, corrective action also must take place at the federal
level."
106. Prior to 1970 development of geothermal resources was not undertaken on public
lands because the Department of the Interior had taken the position that geothermal
resources were not minerals and that it lacked authority to dispose of geothermal
resources contained in public lands under its control. Bjorge, supra note 102, at 5. In
response, Congress enacted the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 which provided that
mineral reservations on land conveyed by the government, after enactment of the Act,
are deemed to include goethermal resources. 30 U.S.C. § 1024 (1970). However, the
particular problem of mineral ownership on lands conveyed before the 1970 Act is left
unresolved. Under the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C. H9 291-302
(1970), the government conveyed 14,000 acres within known geothermal resource areas
[KGRA] while retaining ownership of "coal and other mineral rights." There was no
agreement within the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the drafting of
the 1970 Act as to whether these mineral reservations included geothermal steam and
associated geothermal resources. See Bjorge, supra at 9. In 1972, the government
brought suit against the Union Oil Co. of California to determine whether these mineral
reservations included geothermal energy being produced by Union Oil. The court
treated geothermal resources as water and ruled that since water is not a mineral,
geothermal resources are not reserved under a mineral reservation. United States v.
Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 1289, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The case is being appealed
by the government.
107. Two-thirds of the known geopressurized zones lie off the coasts of Texas and
Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. Section 4 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970), provides that "mineral leases" on the Outer Continental Shelf
shall be maintained as issued only under provisions of this law. Section 23(b) of the
Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 provides that geothermal steam and associated geother-
mal resources underlying lands owned by the United States may be acquired solely in
accordance with the provisions of this Act. 30 U.S.C. - 1022 (1970). Thus, there is no
clearly established authority for the leasing of geothermal resources on offshore lands
under the control of the federal government if the resource is classified as a mineral.
108. Compare United States v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(involving mineral reservation), with Reich v. Commissioner, 454 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1972) (tax classification).
109. There has even been some question as to whether oil and gas fit into the mineral
classification. See generally MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957); Murray
v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S.W. 355 (1897); 1 E. KuNT7, LAW OF OIL AND GAs 305
(1962); 1 H. WiLLmms &C. MEYEns, Om& GAS LAW § 219 (1975).
110. Congress already has enacted legislation extending federal mineral reservations
to include geothermal resources. 30 U.S.C. § 1024 (1970). See discussion note 106
supra.
111. Another problem which may impede prompt development of geothermal re-
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The primary problem area involving potentially conflicting state
and federal laws involves the presence within a KGRA of lands subject
to the jurisdiction of different governmental entities. Under the Geo-
thermal Steam Act of 1970, the Secretary of the Interior has discretion
to conserve properly the geothermal pool and to require lessees to unite
and operate collectively as a unit.1 2 State and privately owned land
adjacent to the federal lands within a KGRA is subject to control and
regulation by the states." 3 Responsibility for the management of a
single geothermal reservoir that underlies lands controlled by separate
jurisdictions thus must be assigned.
The problems which might arise due to separate jurisdictional
control are well illustrated by the experience of the petroleum industry.
The rule of capture has characterized petroleum exploitation in the
United States with unfortunate results; 1 4 each developer, being en-
titled to whatever oil he could produce, literally raced to extract oil to
protect his interest. This resulted in waste, and, on occasion, damage
to the underlying oil pool."15 The rule of capture has recently been
tempered by basin management concepts;"" however, these controls
came late to the petroleum industry. To insure the beneficial develop-
ment of geothermal resources and to prevent overproduction of the
field, such controls should be introduced at the earliest possible state
of development. The reduced output from a geothermal well due to
overproduction can result in a loss of pressure within the well that can
preclude the further generation of energy from the source. The uncer-
tainty resulting from this doubt as to the potential duration of the source
could discourage a geothermal developer. He must have reasonable
assurance that the geothermal resource will support the generating
facility for a sufficient period to justify the investment.
Regulations contained within the 1970 Act require compulsory
pooling, and unitization in production'" which allows all lessees of a
sources is confusion over ownership of byproducts-minerals contained in solution with
the associated fluids of the system. Under the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, 30
U.S.C. § 1001(c) (iv) (1970), the definition of geothermal steam and associated geother-
mal resources includes any byproduct derived from them. If it is valuable, the holder of
a previous mineral grant has a right to the mineral. See id. § 1008. If its value is less
than 75 percent of the value of the geothermal resource, then it belongs to the
geothermal resource lessee. See id. § 1001(d). This system of byproduct allocation
appears to result in a potential windfall to the holder of a prior grant. It would seem
more equitable to grant the geothermal resource lessee any benefits that may be derived
from his investigations, capital outlays, and other efforts. Again, this is a change which
must come from the federal government.
112. Id. 9H 1001-1025.
113. Id. § 1002.
114. 1 R. MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNrnzATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 1967).
115. 1 H. WILLiAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 109, at § 204.6.
116. Shank, Present Status of the Law of Capture, SOUTHwIEsTERN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 297 (1955).
117. 30 U.S.C. § 1017 (1970).
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common pool to share equally in the production. Such a plan seems to
be a significant step in solving the problem of overproduction. Some
states have taken similar action. New Mexico, for example, has en-
acted legislation which permits holders of state geothermal leases for
the same reservoir to enter voluntarily into agreements to enhance pro-
duction, with the state regulating production for maximum recovery.118
However, the discretion is that of the developer, not the state. Consid-
eration should be given to a functional management system, involving
both state and the federal governments, that insures to each developer
the control over its respective lands but, at the same time, guarantees
the proper use and development of the geothermal resource by mini-
mizing waste. A cooperative plan seems to be the most promising
scheme since it takes into account the unique nature of the geothermal
resource.
A governmental role in promoting geothermal development also
seems an appropriate concomitant to the regulatory function. Federal
tax incentives that would encourage industrial development of geother-
mal resources should be made available. Tax writeoffs for geothermal
extractive industries, depletion schedules and depletion allowances for
geothermal resources, and capital gains treatment for profits would be
important economic incentives if offered to geothermal industries. The
state could also offer tax incentives that would favor geothermal indus-
tries. Property used in the extraction of geothermal resources could
be exempted from ad valorem property taxes, and equipment pur-
chased for the extraction could be exempted from sales taxes. Addi-
tionally, income realized from the manufacturing and sale of equipment
for the extraction of geothermal resources could be exempted from
state income taxes.
Wind Energy
Wind energy, another alternative energy source in the develop-
ment stage, also seems amenable to concurrent state and federal law-
making. Aside from the obvious difficulty that only certain areas of
the nation have sufficient sustained wind velocity to allow the economic
utilization of this energy source, the major impediment to prompt
implementation of wind energy systems may involve legal questions of
aesthetic pollution. The objection to electrical transmission towers as
aesthetically degrading would appear to foretell the public reaction to
windmill towers; 19 the possibility of a windmill on every other roof will
118. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 65-11-11(c) (Supp. 1975).
119. Centralized high power windmills could be located in areas where objections
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probably be even less acceptable. Indeed, building codes and zoning
height regulations on the state and local level may now preclude the
installation of windmills or may be so used in the future. Federal and
state governments should act cooperatively in this area to test and
encourage public acceptance of windmills. State governments, with
possible federal assistance, can also make any changes in state enabling
laws necessary to allow local zoning and building code changes favor-
able to wind energy utilization.120
Several additional problems arise from attempts to harness wind
energy. A difficulty shared with solar energy is the lack of a recog-
nized legal interest in the energy source. Courts presently do not
recognize any right to the air flowing across the land of another.' 21
Unless sufficient spacing is maintained, adjacent units could interfere
with one another, thus discouraging widespread utilization. Further,
the public acceptance problem could be exacerbated if a potential
user's right to operate his unit without interference remains uncertain.
State legislation recognizing and protecting wind energy rights is the
preferable solution; in its absence, local zoning controls can remedy the
situation, albeit less effectively.
Other problems arise from the lack of legal standards defining
ownership in the atmosphere and its currents. Rights to wind energy
from federal and state lands must be determined, and appropriate leas-
ing procedures established. Moreover, possible windmill interference
with television and microwave transmissions must be anticipated and
dealt with. Construction of other tall structures-electrical transmis-
sion towers, skyscrapers, and others-has been allowed even though
it interfered with electromagnetic transmissions. State and federal
entities with responsibility for communications and energy development
should confer regarding this problem and attempt to reconcile the com-
peting interests.
Energy from Solid Waste
Finally, attention should focus on the use of solid waste to create
energy, an area which has been the object of considerable recent fed-
would be less likely, such as rural locations or industrial areas. However, the larger
units, approximately 200 feet in height, might encounter objections if located in urban
areas, along coast lines, in recreation areas, or near historical locations. The possibility
of public objection to the windmills may delay their prompt utilization, since such
utilization will require public acceptance. Industrial and financial institutions, if uncon-
vinced of public acceptance, will not make the necessary investments to promote the
development of wind energy systems.
120. See text & notes 97-101 supra.
121. Cf. Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357
(Fla. App. 1959). See text & note 97-99 supra.
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eral and state attention. 122  Organic waste, which constitutes over half
of the total waste generated each year,123 can produce sufficient energy
to replace at least half of present oil imports. 124  Development of this
promising energy source depends on interrelated efforts of state,
federal, and local governments.
In general, the municipalities are responsible for and bear the cost
of collection and disposal of solid waste. This would seem to imply
that the municipalities should also be responsible for implementing pro-
grams whereby recovery from solid waste would become possible.
However, the initial planning and construction costs involved in convert-
ing from a disposal system to a recovery system may be prohibitive to
the municipalities. Further, the quality of solid waste required to be
fed into a processing unit to insure its efficient operation may require
the joint operation of a unit by several municipalities, resulting in
shared benefits and requiring cooperative planning, and development.
With no municipality having more authority than another, disputes
among the municipalities concerning site location and distribution of the
benefits could lead to unnecessary delays in the planning and develop-
ment of the processing unit.
A plan implemented by the states with the cooperation of the mu-
nicipalities appears to be a possible solution. A statewide plan would
help to insure efficient planning and maximum utilization of solid waste
through larger, strategically located processing units. The states could
assist also in financing the planning and construction costs of the
processing units. The aid of the federal government would signifi-
cantly add to these cooperative efforts. Unfortunately, however, the
federal government presently appears to lack a strong commitment to
solid waste recovery, at least in part because waste disposal has been
considered a local rather than national matter. The thrust of waste
management was redirected from disposal to resource recovery and
122. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATE'S ROLE IN SOLID WASTE
MANAGEMENT (1973). Examples of solid waste include household garbage, general
litter, and wastes from agriculture, animals, and mineral processing.
123. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., USING SOLID WASTE TO CONSERVE
RESOURCES AND TO CREATE ENERGY 43 (1975).
124. As an end result of production and consumption, there is an annual production
of 700 million dry tons of organic waste produced yearly, representing 10 quadrillion
BTU's of energy. Presently, 6.6 quadrillion BTU's of energy are imported each year.
The utilization of all 700 million tons of organic waste would negate the necessity of
energy imports and satisfy the goal of energy self-sufficiency. 121 Cong. Rec. H6378(daily ed. July 8, 1975). In a less optimistic estimate, the Environmental Protection
Agency [EPA] has estimated that approximately 80 percent of the total municipal waste
could be used to generate energy; if energy recovery were practiced in all major urban
areas, according to the EPA, the energy produced would be equivalent to more than half
of the 1972 oil imports from the Middle East. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S.,
supra note 123.
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federal involvement initiated by the Resource Recovery Act of 1970,125
authorizing the Secretary of Interior to carry out demonstration proj-
ects.' -6  Still, the federal effort in this area has not significantly
progressed.
The federal role should be much greater. In addition to financing
research and implementation projects, the federal government should
coordinate overall research efforts, providing technical assistance to
state and local governments, providing the necessary incentives for
increased use of recycled materials, and increasing the awareness of
state and local governments of the potential benefits of energy and
resource recovery from solid waste. Should the states fail to begin
prompt utilization of solid waste due to economic pressures or conven-
ience, the federal government has the authority and means to overcome
these problems. Solid waste is a problem national in scope and inter-
state in character. Prompt development of energy recovery from solid
waste will require an expanded and accelerated federal role. Strong
legislation is necessary to insure adequate federal support, guidance,
and initiative.
The federal government, in addition, must take steps to make the
economics of energy recovery from solid waste more attractive. Al-
though state action toward this goal is also possible, the states acting
alone cannot eliminate the presently existing economic disincentives.
The problem lies in three primary areas: discriminatory freight rates,
federal procurement policy toward products containing recycled materi-
als, and taxes favoring utilization of depletable energy resources.
The cost of transportation may be determinative of whether
energy recovery from solid waste can be economical. The marketabil-
ity of recovered energy will depend on its economic competitiveness
with virgin materials used as energy sources. Evidence shows that the
freight rate structure discriminates against some secondary materials in
favor of virgin materials.12 7  Since delivery cost represents a large per-
centage of the price of solid waste, such discrimination in the rate struc-
ture places recovered energy at a serious disadvantage in its economic
competition with virgin resources.
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3254f, 3256-3259 (1970).
126. Id. § 3253(b).
127. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 123, at 29; cf. Aberdeen &
Rockfish R.R. v. S.C.R.A.P., 422 U.S. 289 (1975)
There is, however, disagreement about whether rates charged actually discriminate.
The Interstate Commerce Commission believes the so-called rate disparities stem from
the differences between the transportation characteristics of primary and secondary
materials. See Ex parte 281, Increased Freight Rates and Charges, 346 I.C.C. 88
(1973). Scrap material is generally less dense than virgin material and, therefore,
requires more handling and greater volume of cargo space, which factors supposedly
result in the higher shipping cost attributed to secondary materials.
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A second important factor in ensuring the economic feasibility of
energy recovery from solid waste is the marketability of inorganic
materials separated during processing; such sales could help offset the
necessary cost of processing the solid waste. The federal government,
although the largest single purchaser of many United States goods and
services, consumes less than 4 percent of gross domestic output.128 On
the surface, then, it would appear that the effects of federal government
purchases would be minimal; however, a government program aimed
at the use of recovered materials should increase public awareness of
the potential for recycling. Moreover, the widespread circulation of
federal specifications on recycled material would tend to encourage
state -and local governments, as well as the private sector, to utilize
these materials. Similar purchase policies by the states could add sig-
nificantly to the development of the recovered energy market. Ac-
cording to the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], federal
procurement regulations in the past have favored the purchase of prod-
ucts containing virgin materials, requiring in certain cases that they be
purchased in preference to products containing secondary materials. 120
The General Services Administration responded by instituting a pro-
gram emphasizing the procurement of products containing secondary
materials. °30 This program, aimed primarily at paper products, should
be expanded so as to give maximum incentive to potential developers
of energy from solid waste.
Finally, changes in the system of tax incentives are necessary.
Capital gains treatment for profits, tax writeoffs for extractive indus-
tries, depreciation schedules, and depletion allowances favor the use of
virgin materials. These allowances promote the use of virgin resources
in place of secondary materials, in effect subsidizing virgin material use.
The system of tax incentives should be reversed to favor the utilization
of solid waste.
REGULATION OF ENERGY DISTRIBUTION
The allocation schemes which attend the energy crisis provided an
example of both conflict and cooperation. The federal Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act13' had specific provisions for a state role in
128. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 123, at 37.
129. Id. at 35.
130. Id.
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-753 (Supp. V, 1975). In Section 2 of the law, the reasons for
its passage are set out. The Congress was concerned that "shortages of crude oil,
residual fuel oil and refined petroleum products . . . have created or will create severe
economic dislocations. . . reduction of crop plantings and harvesting, and curtailment
of vital public services [which] jeopardize the normal flow of commerce and constitute a
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allocating petroleum."3 2 In some states cooperation was amicably
achieved, while in others the procedures resulted in strong state objec-
tions. Since the federal government has exerted authority over distri-
bution, it is likely that in future shortages the federal government may
exert even greater controls. Given that these controls will be a result
of shortages and that the goal of the states will be to obtain as much
fuel for their own citizens' needs as they can, conflict seems inevitable.
The transport of energy falls to a large extent within federal regu-
latory authority since energy transit involves interstate commerce.
Whether by pipeline or other means, the federal government, through
the Interstate Commerce Commission [ICC] and the FPC, largely
controls the transport of energy. However, there does exist a role for
the states, particularly in controlling the distribution of electrical
energy.
Electric Utilities
The electric utility industry is currently undergoing extensive
transformation resulting from recent energy shortages, escalating costs,
and increased public indignation at rising prices for electricity service.
In the current context striking the necessary balance between investor
and industry interests on one hand, and consumer interests on the
other, has become an exceedingly complex process. Several federal
national energy crisis which is a threat to the public health, safety and welfare .
Id. § 751(a).
To avoid the existing and potential crisis thus identified, Congress directed the
establishment of a mandatory allocation system for petroleum with the intention of
fulfilling a series of specific objectives. As explained in the conference report, the list of
objectives "is not intended to establish any order of priority." See generally Conference
Report, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. No. 93-628,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 2688 (1973). Rather,
the Executive is to attempt to achieve all the objectives, "to the maximum extent
practicable." 15 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1) (Supp. V, 1975). The objectives to be fulfilled
are as follows:
(A) protection of public health, safety, and welfare... and the national de-
fense; (B) maintenance of all public services . . ; (C) maintenance of agri-
cultural operations. . . ; (D) preservation of an economically sound and com-
petitive petroleum industry [with the need "to preserve the competitive viability
of independent refiners, small refiners, nonbranded independent marketers, and
branded independent marketers" specifically identified]; (E) the allocation of
d . crude oil to.. .permit.., refineries to operate at full capacity.Id.
132. An important aspect of FEA's implementation of the Act, one almost uniformly
praised, was the state set-aside program. The state offices of petroleum allocation were
established by regulation, presumably under the directive in the Act that "[t]he President
may delegate all or any portion of the authority granted to him under this act to such
officers, departments, or agencies of the United States, or to any State (or officer
thereof), as he deems appropriate." 15 U.S.C. § 759(b) (Supp. V, 1975). The
authority delegated in the regulations is rather narrow, applying only to administration
of the set-aside. 10 C.F.R. §§ 211.15, .17 (1976). The states have no authority
at all over fuel coming into the state which does not fall into the 3 percent which is
theirs exclusively to administer.
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agencies have limited authority over electricity distribution; 183 however,
the primary governmental control in this area has traditionally been
with the states. State public utility agencies generally have the power
to prescribe fair and reasonable rates and charges, classifications, and
standards of quality and measurement, and to establish a uniform sys-
tem of accounting and reporting by- each public utility.'34 Further,
such agencies oversee repairs, improvements, additions, and extensions
to the facilities of a public utility which are necessary to provide ade-
quate service and promote the convenience and welfare of the pub-
lic.'3 5  The authority of the states to act in the area of distribution of
electricity is well recognized. 136 However, since new and possibly
untried methods are called for in dealing with the current energy situa-
tion, constitutional limitations on state power should be carefully
delineated.
An important source of limitation on state power to deal in the
area of electricity distribution is the preemptive authority of the various
federal agencies. 137 For example, the FPC has authority over inter-
state sale of electricity,1 3  and requires all public electric utilities to
make periodic reports of their operations and accounts.'3 0 Addition-
ally, it plays an important role in the planning and coordination of
regional electric generating facilities.140 It may order a public utility
to connect its transmission facilities with facilities of one or more
individuals engaged in the transmission or sale of electrical energy, and
to sell or exchange energy with such individuals.' 4' In the event of
an emergency, the FPC may require temporary connections of facilities
and such generation, delivery, interchange, or transmission of electric
energy as it decides will best remedy the situation.' 42 Another federal
agency with responsibilities which affect electric utilities is the EPA.
133. The Federal Power Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the
EPA exercise only limited control over the electric power industry, leaving the bulk of
authority to state regulatory agencies. See text & notes 137-44 infra.
134. M. FAms & T. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTLrTIEs: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT AND
OwNERSnIP 69-71 (1973).
135. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 366.05(1) (1967). There are two major legal obligations
imposed by the states on "business affected with a public interest" which are not imposed
on other privately owned businesses. First, they are required to supply their goods or
services indiscriminately to all members of the public entitled to them. M. FARMus & T.
SAMPSON, supra note 134, at 21. See generally Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
Second, public utilities must sell their product at prices or rates which are "just and
reasonable." M. FARms & T. SAMPSON, supra. Enforcement of these obligations is the
primary goal in state regulation of public utilities.
136. See generally M. FARRis & T. SAMPsON, supra note 134, at 21.
137. See text & notes 11-24 supra.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1970).
139. Id. § 825.
140. S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION 89-121 (1974).
,141. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b) (1970).
142. Id. § 824a(d).
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The EPA, concurrently with state environmental agencies, has author-
ity over the environmental impact of electric utility policies. 143  Finally,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is empowered to deal with the pro-
duction of nuclear energy.'44
Thus the federal government maintains a significant level of
authority over certain specific regulatory areas related to the generation
of electricity.' 45 This authority is direct and affirmative, as in the
determination of fuels and direct regulation of interstate sales by the
FPC, as well as indirect and negative, as in the area of environmental
protection by the EPA. Up to this time, however, there has been no
agreement among the branches of the federal government regarding
the direction a comprehensive regulatory scheme should take. State and
local governments and private individuals are left to exercise consider-
able authority to deal with the evolving electricity conversion problem.
Given this option, the states have generally chosen to concentrate on
electricity distribution issues, such as rate structures, rather than to con-
front directly the conversion problem. It should also be noted that the
143. The EPA is directed by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to adopt and
publish effluent limitations on the discharge of pollutants into the waters subject to
federal jurisdiction. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V, 1975). Permits are required when any
discharge into navigable waters will take place and will be issued if the applicant meets
certain standards. Id. § 1341(a)(1). States are permitted to establish water quality
standards, provided they are consistent with the Act. Id. § 1313(a). The Administrator
of EPA is also required under the Clean Air Act to promulgate national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(c) (4) (1970). States are
responsible for enforcing such standards and for adopting implementation plans which
must be approved by the Administrator. Id. § 1857(c)(5). If the Administrator
disapproves of a plan, or if no plan is submitted, he can propose regulations setting forth
an implementation plan for that state. Id. See generally Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
144. The regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission have been trans-
ferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 42
U.S.C.). The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation was created within the Commission
to perform licensing and regulation functions involving nuclear facilities. 42 U.S.C. §
5843 (b) (Supp. V, 1975). The Office of Nuclear Material and Safety and Safeguards
deals with the processing, transport, and handling of nuclear materials. Id. § 5844.
145. There is some indication that Congress may attempt to set guidelines for the
design of rate structures by state regulatory agencies. The proposed Electric Utilities
Rate Reform Act of 1975, S. 1666, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975); H.R. 6696, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975); cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-786 (Supp. V, 1975), would have re-
quired the regulators to apply a longrun incremental cost analysis in establishing rate
structures which would distribute the "costs proportionately among consumer classes to
the degree their consumption patterns are responsible for such costs." S. 1666, supra, at
§ 5(c); H.R. 6696, supra, at § 5(c). State commissions also would be required to insti-
tute some system of peak load pricing. S. 1666, supra, at § 5(b); H.R. 6696, supra,
at § 5(b). Additionally, the bill contained standards for treatment of promotional and
advertising expenses, S. 1666, supra, at § 7; H.R. 6696, supra, at § 7, fuel adjustment
clauses, S. 1666, supra, at § 8; H.R. 6696, supra, at § 8, and life line rates. S. 1666,
supra, at § 6; H.R. 6696, supra, at § 6. The President's omnibus energy proposal also
deals with state regulation of electric utilities. President's Energy Proposal, S. 594, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 2633 & 2650, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Title VII of
the proposal would have permitted electric utilities to price energy below cost during off-
peak time periods. The proposal also would have dealt briefly with procedures for rate
increases. S. 594, supra, at §§ 704-706; H.R. 2560, supra, at §§ 704-706.
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electric utilities themselves maintain considerable control over the
equipment used, the proposed sites to be developed, and the fuels to
be burned. While the states have considerable power to regulate con-
version they have generally failed to exercise this power except in the
context of other issues.
Natural Gas Utilities
Natural gas is currently under extensive control by the FPC. Fed-
eral regulation began as early as 1938146 as a result of requests by states
which have been frustrated in their attempts to deal with the vertically
integrated industry147 at the local level. During this early period, the
Supreme Court had effectively precluded state regulation of interstate
natural gas as being in violation of the commerce clause.' 48  States
were permitted to regulate only where interstate commerce ended and
intrastate commerce began, that is, where pipeline pressure was
reduced and gas passed into local distribution systems. 4 This left the
states free to control rates charged by distributors to local consumers,
but unable to control prices charged by interstate pipeline companies
to distributors. The purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to fill this gap
between production and distribution in which the states could not act.
The FPC was given regulatory authority over the interstate transporta-
tion of natural gas, including the power to set "just and reasonable"
rates.150 Direct sales and intrastate distribution are not within the
Commission's jurisdiction, 51 although there have been proposals to
extend its power into this area.' 52
Thus, states that import most of their natural gas supply must leave
regulation largely to the federal government; however, the regulatory
situation may face future changes. One of the most controversial issues
in regulatory circles today is the question of decontrol or deregulation
of the natural gas industry. Advocates of deregulation point to FPC
price regulation as the cause of the current gas shortage. 153 There is
general agreement that domestic natural gas reserves are sufficient for
domestic needs for at least the remainder of the century, given reason-
146. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1970).
147. R. Huitt, National Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry, in PUBLIC AD-
MINISTRATION AND POLICY FORMATION 58 (E. Redford ed. 1956).
148. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West Virginia v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
149. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 283 U.S. 465 (1931).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 717(d) (1970).
151. Id. § 717(c).
152. See 114 B.N.A. ENERGY USERS REP. A-17 (1975).
153. HEARINGS PURSUANT TO S. RES. 45 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., NATURAL GAS POLICY ISSUES 788-89
(Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as NATURAL GAS POLICY ISSUES].
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able efforts to locate and produce the gas.154  Yet, production has not
expanded to meet the demand requirements, 155 and the impact of the
shortage has been felt primarily by interstate residential consumers, the
group regulation is intended to benefit most. 156 It is argued that
deregulation would effectively correct the shortage since it would
induce exploration and development of supplies not currently economi-
cal to develop.' 57 Opponents counter that there are shortages of other
petroleum products not subject to regulation; thus, this factor cannot
be blamed for the industry's failure to develop available resources. A
major point of contention centers on whether the industry would be
sufficiently competitive without regulation to operate in a manner not
detrimental to the consumer. Proponents of deregulation assert that
the industry is "workably competitive," pointing out the relatively low
degree of ownership concentration in the production of gas and in
reserve holdings for future production. 58 The argument is that with-
out regulation, prices would rise to the marketclearing level and com-
pete with other alternative supplies available to consumers. Opponents
of deregulation, on the other hand, are adamant in their position that
the industry is not workably competitive and must be regulated to pro-
tect consumers from exploitation. 5 9 Petroleum companies are charac-
terized as approaching oligopolistic control of all energy resources,
thereby becoming full-line vertically integrated energy companies.
Thus, deregulation of natural gas producers could result in the com-
panies' using natural gas price increases to obtain higher prices for oil
products, coal, and other fuels.'6
The states will be generally affected by any change in FPC policy,
including deregulation schemes. Some states are currently using their
limited power over natural gas to allocate gas within their borders.'
If FPC jurisdiction is broadened to include intrastate sales, state power
will correspondingly diminish under the supremacy clause. Any
national priority scheme established by the FPC would have to be
154. Id. at 749. See generally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS. NATURAL GAS PoLIcY ISSUES AND OPTIONS 35 (Comm.
Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as IssuEs AND OPTIONS].
155. NATURAL GAS POLICY IssUES, supra note 153, at 92.
156. S. BREYm & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 140, at 83-87.
157. IssuES AND OPTIONS, supra note 154, at 118.
158. Federal Power Commission statistics from the early sixties indicate that the four
largest gas producers accounted for less than 10 percent and the 15 largest less than 50
percent of national production. S. BRYmlE & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 140, at 60.
159. See, e.g., Statement of David S. Schwartz, Assistant Chief, Office of Economics,
Federal Power Commission, December 13, 1973, in Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 45
Before the Special Subcomm. on Integrated Oil Operations of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-24, pt. 3, at 1116-90 (1973).
160. Id.
161. NATURAL GAS POLICY ISSUES, supra note 153, at 153.
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followed by state regulatory commissions in determining end use in
individual states. Total deregulation, on the other hand, significantly
broadens the states' interest in the distribution and consumption of
natural gas in general.
The degree of unhappiness with the program expressed by some
states thus gives rise to a suggestion that the states should establish their
own allocation system, either to supplement the federal system or to
replace it if the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act expires. The
body of federal law on fuel allocation is so extensive, however, that such
an independent state system seems inadvisable, and may be preempted.
In addition to the fuel allocation act, the Defense Production Act of
1950162 and the Natural Gas Act 63 both contain provisions relating to
fuel allocation. These statutes further illustrate the pervasiveness of
federal control in the area and reinforces the preemption argument.
GOVERNMENT ROLES IN ENERGY CONSERVATION
Since the increase in national awareness of the finiteness of tradi-
tional energy resources, the need for additional conservation measures
has received considerable attention. Unlike the concomitant effort to
develop alternative energy sources, conservation involves areas in
which strict delineations of federal and state authority have been drawn
over the years. The resulting jurisdictional mix may impede prompt
implementation of comprehensive conservation programs, though op-
portunities for coordination do exist and should be utilized.
Building Construction
In the last 8 years, energy consumed in space heating for commer-
cial buildings has almost doubled. 64 There is evidence to suggest that
savings of two-thirds in nominal lighting energies can be achieved by
available technology.16 5 Making energy conservation an overriding
concern in the design, construction, and operation of new buildings
could result in a savings of about 40 percent of the energy per cubic
foot of space now being consumed.1 66 The federal-state balance of
control over building construction is somewhat nebulous. Although the
state has primary control over matters such as zoning ordinances and
building codes, it appears that the federal government, through its
162. Ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1970).
164. R. SLATER & D. MoRRIs, ENERGY CONSERVATION IN PUBLIC AND COMMERCIAL
BUILDINGS 5093 (Rand Paper Series 1973).
165. Id.
166. F. FREEmAN, ENERGY-THE NEW ERA 206 (1974).
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spending and taxing powers, may influence energy consumption in
buildings in the future. Further, the federal government can influence
construction habits by specifications included in such federal loans as
those made by the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Hous-
ing Act.' Nonetheless, primary control in the area of housing codes
resides in the states.
Building regulations are supported by the state police power and,
if reasonable, are valid to the extent they promote the common good.
So long as the regulation is not arbitrary and tends to promote the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, it will be upheld.0 s The
requisite connection of reasonable regulation and rational relation to
legitimate public purpose can be found in the broad public benefits pro-
vided by energy conservation.0 9 The goal of energy conservation thus
is arguably within the ambit of public welfare for which the legislature
may act.' 71
The state may lawfully establish retroactive regulations which
require reasonable changes in existing buildings to improve energy effi-
ciency. In determining whether a substantive retroactive regulation is
reasonable, the essential question under traditional due process notions
is whether the public welfare requires retroactive application and
whether the property owners affected would suffer an unreasonable
burden as compared with the resulting public benefits.' 7' Addition-
ally, under substantial due process restrictions, the end sought by the
167. See Joint Hearings on Conservation and Efficient Use of Energy Before Certain
Subcomm. of the House Government Operations Comm. and the House Science and
Astronautics Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14 pt. 1, at 192 (1973).
168. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). See text & notes 6, 57-59 supra.
169. This includes the achievement of reduction of energy consumption in buildings
of up to 80 percent in some instances. FLORIDA ENERGY COMMITTEE, A REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF ENERGY AND ENERGY POLICY IN FLORIDA TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 168 (1974).
170. Criticism of building codes has only recently focused on energy performance
criteria. NEW ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES FOR BUILDINGS: INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS, A REPORT TO THE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION 171
(J. Stein ed. 1975). Basically, although building codes speak indirectly to energy
efficiency of the structure, the objectives of health and safety in the codes have created
what is called a specification of materials code, as opposed to a performance code. Id.
Thus, the materials of construction and the particular techniques of energy use in the
building industry tend to be perpetuated through definition of the structure in the
building codes. A better approach might conserve energy through definition of perform-
ance of the functions of heating, cooling, and lighting. Statement of Keith Beaty, Staff
Engineer of the Florida Energy Committee, to the Florida Board of Building Codes and
Standards, May 16, 1975 (American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Condi-
tioning Engineers, Inc., Standard 90-75 Workbook, ch. 10 (1975)).
171. Kaukas v. City of Chicago, 27 Ill. 2d 197, 201, 188 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1963). In
defining the difference between a valid regulation and an invalid one, the primary
question is one of degree. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
In building regulations, an enactment which is retroactive and places an unreasonable
burden on the building owner rather than resulting in public benefit may amount to a
taking of property without due process, United States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415
(3d Cir. 1944); unless reasonable compensation is paid to the owner, the enactment
would be invalid.
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legislature must be a legitimate public purpose, yet the means must not
be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. 172 Generally no rights are
violated if the sum required to be spent by the property owner is
reasonable under the circumstances. For example, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a building ordinance requiring the installation
of a sprinkler system costing $7,500 in a building worth only
$25,000.173 In another case, the South Carolina supreme court sus-
tained an ordinance which required the plaintiff to repair his rental
property at a cost exceeding $575 for each of the over 100 units he
owned. 174 The court felt the ordinance to be reasonable and not a tak-
ing of property without compensation. 75  Courts have also upheld
energy-related housing code requirements, ranging from a provision
mandating room heating facilities176 to a water heater requirement. 177
In addition to due process constraints, there are two other limita-
tions on police power energy regulations such as those which would be
instituted by a state under its building code. The supremacy clause
requires that a state statute yield in case of a direct conflict with an
exercise by the federal government of its constitutional powers.178  The
remaining restriction on state statutes is the equal protection clause.
Equal protection demands that the law have the same effect on all per-
sons and property belonging to the same class and under similar condi-
tions. "The Fourteenth Amendment permits the states a wide scope
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens dif-
ferently than others. 17 9  A state statute may not be struck down as
offensive of equal protection in its scheme of classification unless it is
obviously arbitrary; moreover, except in the case of a statute embody-
ing discrimination so patently without reason that no conceivable situa-
tions of fact could be found to justify it, the claimant who challenges
the statute bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that its
classifications lack rationality." 0 This presumption of validity places
a heavy burden of proof of harm on those challenging the law,' 18 and
at least where the government is carrying out an essential public serv-
ice, the statute may be validated simply upon an affirmative showing
172. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
173. Queensboro Hills Realty Co. v. SaxI, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
174. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
175. Id. at 553, 88 S.E.2d at 690.
176. Danker v. City of New York, 20 Misc. 2d 557, 194 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
177. City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960).
178. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 186, 211 (1824). See text accompany-
ing notes 12-15 supra.
179. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
180. Id. at 535 (Frankfurter & Harlan, J.J., concurring).
181. Harrell Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So. 2d
439, 443 (Fla. 1959).
[VOL. 18
ENERGY POLICY AUTHORITY
of a relation between the ordinance and the public health, safety, or
welfare.'82 Despite this broad state authority to classify, however, a
state regulation will be overturned if it is obviously arbitrary and
discriminatory.'
Pursuant to the commerce clause, Congress could enact a uniform
national building code if national uniformity proves necessary to pre-
vent inconsistent local regulation from interfering with interstate com-
merce.18 4  Under present preemption doctrine, however, this alone
might not be sufficient to prevent totally state regulation in the area.'8 5
If federal uniform building codes were to have full preemptive effect,
a firm expression of congressional purpose and explicit preemption of
state regulation might be required.
At present the most important source of federal standards for both
existing and proposed structures is the Department of Housing and
Urban Development [HUD]. If liberally construed and administered,
the mortgage refinancing authority of the 1974 Housing Act, 8 6 under
a new section,' 8 7 should be used to encourage building improvements
conducive to energy conservation. Traditionally, building owners have
obtained funds for deferred maintenance, repairs, and rehabilitation by
refinancing residential properties every 10 years or so."8 8 While insti-
tutional lenders no longer supply this financing very readily,8 " section
223(f) can offer owners an opportunity to accomplish repairs; its
authority is not limited to older areas or to low or moderate income
residents. Its broad language permits HUD for the first time to insure
mortgages on existing housing where "substantial rehabilitation" will
not be undertaken.' 90 Participating owners will be required to make
repairs and improvements to satisfy applicable local housing codes and
182. United Sanitation Services, Inc. v. City of Tampa, 302 So. 2d 435 (Fla. App.
1974).
183. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
184. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
185. See generally Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1975); R.G. Indus. Inc. v.
Askew, 276 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
In recent times the Supreme Court has employed the supremacy clause spar-
ingly to strike down state law. Even where extensive federal regulatory
schemes have been enacted, if there is no express congressional language of
preemption, states have been allowed to act in the interests of the federal regu-
latory network.
Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., supra at 857.
186. Housing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970).
188. G. STERNLIEB, THE URBAN HOUSING DILEMMA: THE DYNAMICS OF NEW YORK
CITY'S RENT CONTROLLED HOUSING 48, 581-649 (1970).
189. Id.
190. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MORTGAGE INSURANCE
FOR THE PURCHASE OR REFINANCING OF EXISTING MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING PROJECTS §
223(f) (1975).
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the objectives of the HUD Minimum Property Standards. 10 1 Such stand-
ards could easily include energy conservation requirements.
The impact of existing federal programs is limited, however, by
the ability of the states to establish more stringent building standards
to be met before local occupancy permits are granted. States generally
retain the power to adopt laws affecting the subject of a federal statute,
so long as the federal purpose is not undermined. 192 Additionally, in
view of the traditional role of the state police powers even a federal
uniform building code could likely be viewed by the courts as an
unwarranted intervention in local governmental activities. Thus, the
federal role in influencing building construction for more efficient
energy utilization will probably remain a limited one.
Transportation
Transportation is also a key energy policy area because of its
relation to energy consumption. Transportation users depend heavily
on petroleum products for their energy. Thus oil policy and foreign
affairs are heavily interrelated with transportation programs, as are
domestic oil production regulations. Environmental considerations also
are interrelated with transportation energy consumption in such areas
as vehicle emission standards and the Clean Air Act.' 93
Federal jurisdiction in transportation affairs is similar to federal
authority in other energy-related areas. Transportation policy places
particular emphasis on the commerce clause and the national power to
"provide for the common defense" as the basis for jurisdiction. 194 The
federal government exercises broad-ranging powers to insure that inter-
state commerce is not burdened. Vehicle standards, ratemaking
authority, and the like are examples of federal action in pursuit of this
power. Providing for the defense of the nation is a constitutional man-
date for the federal government to participate in the design and devel-
opment of transportation facilities. The interstate highway system is
an example of a transportation facility built to assist in the national
defense.'0 5 States also have considerable regulatory authority over
transportation by virtue of the police power.
Private Transportation. The use of automobiles is regulated by
government through taxes and licensing. There are taxes on the pur-
191. 24 C.F.R. § 200.925 (1976).
192. See Kewanne Oil Co. v. Becron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637 (1971).
193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (Supp. V, 1975).
194. 23 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970).
195. Id.
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chase of automobiles and on gasoline, the latter imposed by federal,
state, and in some places local government. The gas tax is of particular
importance because it is directly tied to automobile use. The consump-
tion of gasoline is relatively inelastic,19 6 therefore, present taxes, total-
ling about 11 cents per gallon, do little to discourage auto use. A large
federal tax of perhaps 40 cents a gallon, however, might result in a sub-
stantial decrease in auto use, and hence a substantial energy savings.
Presently, the federal government perpetuates America's depend-
ence on the automobile through the Highway Trust Fund. 9 7 The fund
is financed through taxes, including 100 percent of the funds raised by
federal taxes on gasoline, diesel fuel, tires, and vehicle parts. 9 In the
past this fund has been earmarked exclusively for highway appropria-
tions.' 99 Even though the fund has now been opened to allow expendi-
tures for mass transit,"°0 the bias of the trust fund is clear: "it is unfair
and unjust to tax motor-vehicle transportation unless the proceeds of
such taxation are applied to the construction, improvement, or mainte-
nance of highways." ' 1 The federal government is not alone in segre-
gating tax monies raised by gasoline use for maintenance and construc-
tion of roads. For example, 6/7 of the gasoline taxes collected in
Florida "shall be used for the construction and maintenance of state
roads. 20 2  Thus, at the state level also, the perpetuation of the auto-
mobile is statutorily ordained.
A state can regulate goods under its police power without violat-
ing the commerce clause only where a mode of interstate commerce
is not unduly burdened. 0 ' Thus, a state would probably be limited
in its ability to regulate the sale of autos. Taxes on inefficient vehicles
or on fuel-consuming accessories would probably be upheld, however.
If the tax imposed correlates to the weight of the vehicles, the tax can
be tied to additional maintenance required on roads due to their use
by heavier vehicles.20 4 However, title III of the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act preempts any state efforts which would conflict with
automobile fuel economy standards set by the federal government.20 5
196. New York Times, July 27, 1975, at 5F, col. 1.
197. 23 U.S.C. § 120 (1970).
198. Id. § 120(c)(1).
199. Id. § 120(f)(1).
200. See 23 U.S.C. § 142 (Supp. V, 1975) (providing that in order to encourage the
development, improvement and use of public mass transportation systems, the secretary
of transportation may approve as a project on any federal aid system, the construction of
exclusive or preferential bus lanes, highway traffic control devices, bus passenger loading
areas and facilities as well as transportation corridor parking facilities).
201. 23 U.S.C. § 126 (Supp. V, 1975).
202. FLA. STAT. § 206.46 (1971), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 206.46 (Supp. 1976).
203. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
204. Miami Transit Co. v. McLin, 101 Fla. 1233, 133 So. 99 (1931).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 2009 (Supp. V, 1975).
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The obvious corollary to discouraging the sale and use of inefficient
motor vehicles is to encourage the use of more efficient vehicles.
Incentives could be established by exempting certain efficient accesso-
ries, such as radial tires, from -the sales tax. Programs also might be
implemented which discourage the use of all automobiles. For
example, during the Arab oil embargo, there was a prohibition of
Sunday gasoline sales.20 6
Another energy conservation measure that seems particularly sus-
ceptible to incentives is encouragement of carpooling. Eighty-two
percent of working Americans commute to their jobs in automobiles,2 0 7
many of them driving alone. Over 34 percent of all passenger-car travel
in the United States involves commuting to and from work. 08 Incentives
aimed at encouraging carpooling can be provided through preferential
traffic lanes, parking facilities, and toll rates. Federal funding is avail-
able to the states for implementation of carpool incentives through the
Emergency Highway Conservation Act 2°9 and the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act.210
Mass transit systems provide another effective alternative for
decreasing automobile use. The FEA has flatly declared, "public trans-
it is two to four times more energy efficient than the auto."'21' Fed-
eral responsibilities concerning mass transit are mainly located in
the Urban Mass Transportation Administration [UMTA] which is part
of the Department of Transportation. Federal assistance for mass
transit, is authorized in the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,
most recently amended in 1974.212 Such assistance, available only to
urban areas, is intended "for improving the efficiency of transit serv-
ices. ' 21 3 Projects which may be authorized under this plan include
both capital and operating expenditures.21 4
The states are the more logical level of government to handle mass
transit utilization since transportational needs often are regional in
206. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 1973, at 24.
207. CITIZEN'S .ADVISORY COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, CITIZEN ACTION
GUIDE TO ENERGY CONSERVATION 18 (1974).
208. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, PROJECT INDEPENDENCE, Blueprint A-106
(1974).
209. 23 U.S.C. § 101 tSupp. V, 1975).
210. PUB. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 868 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42, 50
U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1975)).
211. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 208, at 101. Such statements
obscure the relevant issues of when, where, and how mass transit is to be more energy
efficient.
212. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (1970), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (Supp. V,
1975).
213. Id. § 1601 (b)(1).
214. Id. § 1602. Assistance for operating expenditures was enacted in 1974, and
significantly enlarges federal assistance, which is not to exceed 80 percent of capital
expenditures, or 50 percent of operating expenditures.
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nature. No one municipality can cope with the problem, and usually
local governments are given only very narrow powers by the state.
States have been active in considering mass transit plans; a number of
them have also developed carpooling plans, both for government and
private employees. States are also asked to coordinate and present
statewide plans to meet federal guidelines.
It is local officials, however, to whom citizens turn when their pub-
lic transit is inefficient, or incapable of getting them to a desired loca-
tion at a proper time. Local responses have included increased use
of buses, carpool lanes, and dial-a-ride. The local role is largely one
of planning and implementation. The funds appropriated under
UMTA have provided an incentive for local areas to begin implement-
ing such energy conservation measures. 15
Commercial Transportation. Commercial transportation involves
the movement of freight and people. The authority to regulate inter-
state commercial transportation lies with the federal government and is
based upon the Constitution's commerce clause.216 State action must
not unduly restrict interstate commerce, 21" and regulation must be pur-
suant to a valid state interest.218 States have a limited role in measures
to conserve energy used in commercial transportation, though the possi-
bility of an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce looms
large over any such proposal. For example, a state might attempt to
promote more efficient commercial transportation by levying taxes
upon less efficient modes. If interstate transporters were involved, ju-
risdiction would be limited to the intrastate portion of the carrier's busi-
ness. And even then, no action could be taken which would unduly
burden interstate commerce. 2 19 Another argument which might be
raised against regulations which vary from state to state is that commer-
cial transportation is so interstate in nature that a uniform national sys-
tem is the only feasible means of regulation.220
Federal regulation of interstate commerce is among the oldest and
most well established regulatory powers. The Interstate Commerce
Act, passed in 1887,221 is the nation's oldest statute authorizing direct
215. A potential shortcoming of federal mass transit assistance is that one recipient is
designated for each urban area. This becomes an issue when there is more than one city
in an urban area. The minority city may not be adequately represented in the program
developed by the recipient. Since the availability of mass transit facilities may be a key
factor in the development of an area, equitable treatment throughout the area is called
for.
216. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
217. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
218. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
219. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
220. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
221. 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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federal regulation of industry.22 2 Principal areas of commercial trans-
portation regulation include air transport, domestic water transport, and
surface transport, including rail carriers.
The necessity for energy conservation has altered regulation of
commercial transport. In the past era of cheap and abundant fuel,
neither the practices of industry itself nor the goals of government
regulation stressed the conservation of energy. The purpose of federal
regulation was to insure that "[a]ll charges made for any service ren-
dered or- to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property
...shall be just and reasonable. 2 s2 3  Shifting freight movement to
more energy-efficient modes is now an important objective, 224 as is gen-
erally decreasing the demand.
Decreasing demand for freight services cannot be as easily accom-
plished as decreasing demand for private transportation, however.
There is less frivolous use of commercial transportation, and market
forces encourage elimination of unnecessary costs. In addition, unlike
private transportation, relatively little freight movement is done for
pleasure. If an industry or company were impeded in its business by
government regulations which prevented it from using freight transpor-
tation, a taking issue would be raised. While the use of property can
be restricted by government without that action constituting a taking,22 1
the prevention of interstate commerce by this type of regulation would
probably not be upheld. There are also strong policy reasons for not
discouraging the use of commercial transportation. The nation is
attempting economic recovery, and freight transportation is basic to
business advances. This is an important factor, even when weighed
against the need to conserve fuel.
A more promising conservation area involves increasing the effi-
ciency of the various transportation modes. At present, many govern-
mental regulations promote energy-inefficient uses, a notable example
being the federal requirement of gateways for interstate truck transport.
This requires that common carriers transport goods only according to
routes authorized by the ICC, thus frequently causing truckers to travel
unnecessary miles. 220 The ICC is attempting to alleviate this situation
222. PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY 5 (J. Miller ed. 1975).
223. 49 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1970).
224. See FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINmSTRATON, supra note 208, at A-94.
225. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
226. [A] motor common carrier authorized to transport the same commodity
over irregular routes between Illinois and Pennsylvania points and also be-
tween Pittsburgh, Pa., and Washington, D.C., may transport that commodity
from Chicago to Washington, in which event it must move via the Pittsburgh
gateway.
INT-RSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N, MOTOR COMMON CARRIERS OF PROPERTY, RouTES AM
SERviCE, Ex PAPTE No. 55, at 532 (1975).
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through the elimination of gateway requirements when a carrier, by
using the most direct highway route, can save up to 20 percent of its
authorized route mileage.227 Interestingly, where a greater than 20
percent savings is involved, an appropriate application seeking direct-
service authority would be required. Such government regulations
requiring activities which inefficiently and unnecessarily use fuel are
an anachronism. Regulations must be scrutinized to prevent govern-
ment, in its regulatory capacity, from causing commercial transport to
use methods which are circuitous, uneconomical, and inefficient.
Transportation issues are likely to see some dramatic and far-
reaching changes in the near future. Alterations in the petroleum
supply and cost situation have already had significant impact on trans-
portation patterns. There are several significant factors which may
affect future transportation programs. First, mass transit and rapid
transit programs are being increasingly emphasized by the federal
government. Environmental concerns, particularly standards imposed
by the Clean Air Act,228 will have to be considered in planning trans-
portation programs for the future. Moreover, because governmental
entities are presently short of funds, proposals which require intensive
capital expenditures are unlikely to be approved in the future. Finally,
without federal leadership, state and local transportation planning
suffers from various uncertainties in trying to project future transporta-
tion programs.
THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM IN THE ENERGY ISSUE
A few areas of energy regulation exist which by nature will fall
within the exclusive domain of the federal government. Matters relat-
ing to foreign affairs are and will continue to be exclusively federal
matters. Similarly, national security is an issue of federal concern. The
propriety of the exercise of that power may be questioned, however, as
to whether a matter claimed to be foreign affairs or national security
is properly designated. In the past, for example, the definition of na-
tional security as it relates to energy justifed the construction of dams
and the formation of the TVA.22 9 In the future, it may be possible
that valid national concerns, such as national defense or security, may be
invoked to expand federal authority. In addition, as petroleum becomes
scarcer and domestic resources decrease, the actual impact of petroleum
policy on national defense will increase. For example, the authority
227. Id. at 537.
228. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (Supp. V, 1975).
229. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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to ration gasoline during World War II was premised on national se-
curity; extreme shortages could be utilized to justify such activities even
in peace time if the shortages were great enough.
The interstate commerce power, as discussed previously, 30 is also
a matter where preeminent federal power exists. Since the limits of
this power are at best unclear, the limits of its exercise in the field of
energy policy are less than predictable. For example, the federal gov-
ernment is utilizing the commerce power to claim exclusive authority
over all automobile efficiency standards.28' Title II of the Energy Pol-
icy and Conservation Act [EPCA] preempts state efforts which conflict
with federal fuel standards.2 32
In addition to the federal government's exclusive authority, the
states also retain exclusive authority over some issues. For example,
the states have the power to make decisions regarding their own pur-
chase of energy consuming items, that is, procurement. In fact, this
authority is recognized specifically in the EPCA.233 Other examples
of traditional state authority include zoning, building codes, and utility
regulation. To some extent, however, each of these areas is being in-
creasingly affected by federal activity. For example, a federal land use
bill which would substantially affect the states is a recurring subject of
congressional activity. In addition, a nationwide building code has
been proposed. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 affects lo-
cal zoning control. 23 4 Bills have been introduced which would affect
state utility regulations. 23 5 Each of these cases indicates a continuing
possibility of conflict or cooperation between state and federal govern-
ments. Each initiative of state and federal government without con-
scious coordination increases the potential for conflict. To optimize
the interaction of state and federal governments, some general princi-
ples as to their respective roles should be articulated.
The Federal Role
There are unquestionably distinctions between the motives and
goals of the individual states and the concerns of those states collec-
tively as a nation. The more parochial interests of the states may not
encompass the long-term national perspective required in energy pol-
icy. Therefore, the primary role of national government should be to
230. See text & notes 31-42 supra.
231. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat.
871 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.).
232. Id.
233. Id. at §§ 327, 509.
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001-4127 (1970).
235. H.R. 12461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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provide guidance for the citizenry and national welfare as a whole,
rather than for geographical sections. This overall guidance should in-
clude sources of energy data and information which may be utilized na-
tionwide to avoid unnecessary duplication in research and development
in several states. Further, it is the responsibility of the federal govern-
ment to provide the overall framework within which the states will
make their own policy. Without this guidance, conflict would occur
not only between the state and federal governments, but also among
the states.
The federal government may become increasingly involved in
diverse matters relating to energy policy. The degree to which it be-
comes involved in state-related areas would likely be a function of the
degree to which the states have successfully and aggressively pursued
their own policies. Currently, the federal government's principal state-
ment of guidance for state governments is the EPCA. However, much
legislation is pending in Congress which could affect state energy pol-
icy. Because the federal government possesses broad powers, there
are very few areas in which there is no potential for federal action. As
the energy issue becomes more crucial, it is likely that the federal gov-
ernment's activities will grow and expand into areas which have been
more traditionally of state concern, such as utility rates and housing
codes. However, if the states themselves act affirmatively to imple-
ment energy policies, the federal government may not be required to
intervene as substantially as it might otherwise.
The State Role
It is crucial that the states recognize that it is in the best interest
of their citizens to utilize the police power to establish energy conserva-
tion as a state policy. This realization can establish the foundation for
utilization of the police power in many areas of concern. There is po-
tential for the states to provide an innovative example for the federal
government, and to implement programs which can provide models for
other states. There are many areas of concern on the agenda for state
action. One way to view the potential for state action is by phases of
the energy production-consumption process.
Exploration and Production of Energy Phase. While obtaining
energy resources is a matter of concern to both state and federal gov-
ernments, the states retain a large measure of control through environ-
mental regulations over exploration within their borders. The states,
however, are not empowered to limit production to advance their own
parochial interests if detrimental to the nation as a whole. The devel-
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opment of resources- of the coastal states also relates to exploration and
production. Offshore production has been a major source of conflict
between the states and the federal government. However, a major at-
tempt at cooperation, the Coastal Zone Management Act,230 is currently
being implemented. While the Act is not aimed primarily at energy
policy, it does provide a mechanism through the use of federal funds
for state control of coastal zone development, including energy-related
onshore activities.
Processing and Conversion Phase. Changing oil resources into
energy is heavily affected by environmental concerns of both the state
and federal government. Processing and conversion of both petroleum
and nuclear fuels are heavily controlled and regulated. Within this is-
sue the location and siting of nuclear power plants has been and will
continue to be an area of conflict. It has been the subject of initiative
in the West and litigation in the East. The ultimate extent of state
authority to affect nuclear power has not yet been decided under the
current statutory scheme.
Under the Clean Air Act, the states are allowed to require the
burning of coal with less than one percent sulfur content, thus heavily
influencing conversion of coal for electricity. As pressure increases to
use coal, new federal standards may be promulgated with the intent
to override state restrictions. A new and emerging area of concern is
control of conversion of solar energy for electricity. The primary ques-
tion is who will set standards of performance for solar devices. To this
point, standard setting has occurred at the state rather than the federal
level.237 This could result in nonuniform standards among the states,
which could cause problems for manufacturers and thus delay the im-
plementation of solar energy technology.
Distribution and Transportation Phase. The federal government
has heavily controlled nationwide allocation under the Emergency Pe-
troleum Allocation Act.238 It is likely that future shortages and alloca-
tion schemes will be heavily controlled by the federal government.
Given that these controls are a result of shortages and the goal of states
is to obtain as much fuel for their citizens' needs as they can, conflict
seems inevitable in this area. Transport of energy falls largely within
federal regulatory authority since energy transport involves interstate
commerce. Whether by pipeline or by other means, the federal gov-
ernment, through the ICC and the FPC, controls the transportation of
236. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. V, 1975).
237. See Solar Energy Standards Act of 1976, ch. 76-246, §§ 1-5, 1976 Fla. Laws
613.
238. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (Supp. V, 1975).
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energy. One of the major examples of recognition by the federal gov-
ernment of the states' role occurs in the area of energy transportation.
The Deepwater Port Act of 1974 grants to the governors of coastal
states the right to veto the siting of deepwater ports in adjacent
states.239 Under that Act, the federal government specifically accorded
a role to the states in controlling transportation of petroleum through
the use of deepwater ports.
Utilization and Consumption of Energy Phase. The area of use
control is the focus of energy conservation. Since energy conservation
is of increasing importance, it is likely that both the state and federal
government will be more active. However, it is here that the state pos-
sesses the greatest intrinsic authority to implement energy policy. The
following is a list of energy-related policies which states should consider
in utilization of its police power to reduce the consumption of energy:
(1) Implementation of state zoning and land-use policies which
encourage energy conservation. This strategy would specifically re-
quire states to consider energy matters in the location of developments,
industries, and the like. In addition, zoning should be considered for
protecting the use of solar devices and for improving industrial siting
for optimal use of energy availability.
(2) Utilization of building and housing codes. The EPCA has
required the states to implement an energy-conscious housing code in
order to receive federal funding. Numerous schemes have been de-
vised by the states to implement or to encourage energy conservation
in buildings, from tax breaks to direct building code requirements.
(3) Promotion of alternative sources of energy. States have the
capability to encourage the use of solar energy as well as the utilization
of solid waste for production of electricity. In fact, many states have
implemented such policies, and the broader their use of these alterna-
tive sources, the greater collective national benefit.
(4) Promotion of conservation in transportation. States have
within their power the ability to improve mass transportation and en-
courage its use through wise land planning and through encouragement
of carpooling, vanpooling, and special traffic lanes. This is another
area in which the federal government has directly mandated some state
action for the receipt of federal funds.
(5) Implementation of energy-conscious procurement. The au-
thority to affect procurement is specifically recognized by the federal
government, and certain states are implementing energy-wise policies.
239. Pub. L. No. 93-627, § 4(c)(9), 9(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2128 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1503(c) (9), 1508(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1975).
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The ability of states to take the lead in consuming energy-efficient
products can set both an example and encourage industry to produce
such products.
(6) Restructuring of utility rates. Although states traditionally
have regulated utility rate structures, the goal in the past has been to
ensure a fair rate of return on utility investments rather than control
the amount of energy consumed. The rate-setting agencies in many
states have adopted or considered rate structures which would tend to
encourage the conservation of energy.
Other Policy Considerations
There are many other issues related to energy policy which are
just beginning to be raised. Increased efficiency in the utilization of
resources, such as the use of waste heat, solid wastes, and returnable
containers, provide examples of an issue where state-federal bound-
aries have yet to be drawn. In many of these areas states have taken
tentative steps while awaiting some definitive policy from the federal
level. For example, the impact of energy policy on disadvantaged
groups, such as the aged and the poor, has largely been neglected at
both the state and federal levels. Increased attention is being given
to this topic in areas such as "lifeline" utility rates, weatherization of
low income homes, and mass transportation for the elderly.
The energy issue raises many questions of federal-state roles. The
resolution of these issues is likely to cause a major evolution, if not rev-
olution, in the concept of federalism. Assessment of the continuing
areas of conflict reveals that, at best, predictions as to future disposition
of various issues is uncertain. Yet, the energy issue is not one in which
policy can await future clarity. Therefore, state and federal govern-
ments should begin to act in the public interest and promote energy's
effective use. State governments cannot afford to wait for the federal
government to solve their problems. States must act in the interest of
their citizenry to alleviate energy-related problems where jurisdictional
authority permits. The federal government must recognize the poten-
tially valuable role of the states in the development of energy policy
and should encourage state action. This can be accomplished through
a comprehensive federal plan which provides leadership and increased
certainty, on which local decisionmakers can base their decisions. The
federal government should finance innovative pilot projects so that their
efficacy can be tested for state implementation. There are areas where
the federal government is more capable of policy formulation than the
state governments, but there are corresponding areas in which states
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are better qualified to act. Resolution of areas of effective authority
is essential for satisfactory solutions to existing energy problems.
CONCLUSION
The division of authority between state and federal governments
has been a matter of continuing concern throughout the history of the
country. Because of the complexity of the energy issue, it not only
reaches many of the traditional areas of conflict between the state and
federal governments, but also creates new ones. As each level of gov-
ernment begins to take more extensive action, the issue of the division
of state and federal authority becomes more complex. Moreover, this
complexity is intensified by the increasing diversity of energy resources
and sophistication of delivery technology. In the near future it is antici-
pated that state and federal governments will extend their activity in
the area of energy policy-the state governments through their police
powers and the federal government through its constitutional authority.
While it is possible that in some spheres each may operate independ-
ently, it is more likely that either cooperation must be generated or
conflict will ensue.
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